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ABSTRACT
Market Reaction to Seasoned Equity Offerings: The Relevance o f
Leverage, Growth Opportunities, and Corporate Structure
Mojib Ahmed
Old Dominion University, 1998
Chair: Dr. Kenneth Yung
Empirical work on the market’s reaction to seasoned equity offerings has rarely
considered the impact o f the issuing firm’s leverage level or it’s corporate structure. This
work is an attempt to include these parameters in order to better understand the market’s
reaction to such issue announcements.
The current finance literature recognizes the fact that leverage plays an important
role in assessing the value of the firm. Leverage has both negative and positive impacts
on the value of a firm (McConnell and Servaes, 1995), and thus, has both negative and
positive impacts on the market’s reaction to seasoned equity offerings. This work
attempts to isolate the positive and negative impacts o f leverage, and finds that whether
the issue is viewed negatively or positively depends on the nature of the issue and the
issuer’s characteristics.
Contradicting the traditional view o f the positive impact of growth opportunities
on the market’s reaction to issue announcements, this paper argues that the impact of
growth opportunities on seasoned equity offerings should be negative. This is because
most of the issuing firms are high growth firms, and the issue itself cannot be a success
unless the issue implies a growth opportunity. The marginal growth impact of the issue
becomes the dominant force in determining the direction of the market reaction. As the
marginal growth impact of issue investment is greater for low-growth opportunity firms,
the low-growth opportunity firms have a less negative market reaction to seasoned equity
announcements than do high-growth opportunity firms. Additionally, high growth
opportunity firms also suffer from a higher level o f information asymmetry. The
empirical findings overwhelmingly support the both arguments.
While examining the impact o f corporate structure on the market’s reaction to
seasoned equity offerings, it is found that high-focused firm’s seasoned equity issue
announcements have a less negative market reaction than those of low-focused diversified
firms. But firms which have increased their focus level in the recent past have a greater
negative market reaction to an equity issue than do the firms which have decreased their
focus. It is argued that issue announcements preceded by divestiture makes the market
skeptical about the financing need o f the issuer.
Co-chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Mohammad Najand
Dr. Vinod Agarwal
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In a recent work,

Lee, Lockhead,

Ritter,

and Zhao

(1996) documented that the average cost of raising external
capital for U.S.

corporations is higher for equity based1

financing than debt based financing.

Using data from 19 90

to 1994, they found that the average direct cost of
financing from initial public offerings

(IPOs)

is about 11.0

p ercent.

The average direct cost for seasoned equity

offerings

(SEOs)

is 7.1 percent.

For convertible and

straight debt the costs are 3.8 percent and 2.2 percent
respectively2.

Yet,

the total number of equity

SEOs) offerings are about three times the debt
and straight)

(IPOs and
(convertible

offerings.

Lee, et. a l .(1996), also documented that the number of
seasoned equity issue events surpasses the combined total
numbers of convertible and straight debt issue events.
During the same p e r i o d (1990-1994)

the number of seasoned

1

Equity sold to the new investors.
It is possible that
some of the n e w investors are existing shareholders

2

It is possible that the reported cost of debt issue does
not include the implied cost of issuing debt, such as
bankruptcy cost, agency cost and so forth.
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equity offering events was 1.5 times the number of straight
debt issuing events.

The puzzling part of these findings is

that a lot of empirical studies indicate that the stock
market reaction to equity offering is significantly negative
and therefore value decreasing for the issuing firm.
On the other hand, some studies do find insignificant
positive market reaction to seasoned equity offerings.

The

works that have reported the percentage of positive
responses include: Barclay and Litzenberger
(1987), Choi,

Masulis, and Nanda

(1988), Bradford

(1992), and Varma

(1995).

The reported numbers of significant positive responses range
between 19%

(Barclay and Litzenberger)

and 27%

(Varma) .

Thus it seems that about one-quarter of the sample firms
experience positive abnormal returns with the announcement
of seasoned equity financing.
value decreasing,

Thus,

if equity issues are

then why are so many firms choosing to

issue equity?
Given the dichotomous evidence of negative and positive
market reaction to equity offerings the present work
contributes to the literature by making an empirical
assessment of how a firm's leverage and growth opportunities
would affect the market reaction to firm's seasoned equity
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offering.

The significance of this contribution is that so

far, the effect of leverage an d growth opportunities have
been considered in isolation without any consideration of
their possible mutual interaction.

This study also

contributes to the current literature by examining the
impact of corporate structure on seasoned equity issue
announcements.

The examination of issuing firm's leverage,

growth opportunities and corporate structure is expected to
provide some missing pieces of the puzzles related to the
issue of seasoned equity offerings.

This would facilitate a

more accurate understanding of the market's behavior around
the seasoned equity a n no unc em en ts .
The remaining part of the paper is organized as:
Section II - reviews the empirical and theoretical
researches on the valuation effect of equity financing;
Section III - addresses the impact of issuing firm's
existing leverage on the value of the issuing firm's at the
announcement of such issue and different hypotheses were
developed.

This section also develops hypotheses regarding

the impact of diversification on the market reaction to
seasoned equ i t y offerings.

Sec ti on IV - describes the data

collection process and outlines the methodology.
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Section V

4

contains the results of the event study and cross sectional
analysis of the hypotheses developed in section III.
Finally,

Section VI concludes the study.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Prior to Modigliani and Miller's
irrelevance theory

(MM) capital

(1958) , the corporate capital market was

not as sophisticated as today.

The capital market at that

time consisted fundamentally of equities and occasionally
debt.
1963) .

Debt was viewed as a necessary evil

(Donaldson,

Firms would only issue debt when equity issues were

not a viable option.

In 1963,

the MM tax correction paper

changed manifestly the attitude of academics towards debt to
a warm embrace.

More recently,

finance researchers have

broadened their view on debt financing and have identified
other associated benefits and detriments.

Today whether a

new investment should be financed through equity or debt or
a combination of both depends on the relative cost3 and
benefit of such financing on the value of the firm.
managers try to maximize shareholder's wealth,

3

As

reaction of

These costs include all direct costs, such as, the cost
of issue, impacts on the overall cost of capital, and
indirect costs, such as, the agency cost of debt, and the
agency costs of managerial discretion.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

6

the capital market assumes a crucial role in the choice of
corporate financing4.
There have been extensive efforts by researchers to
isolate the differential impacts of each type of offering.
Smith

(1986)

put forth four generalizations of the impact of

external financing on the value of the firm that previous
empirical research had discovered:5 (1) External financing
does not increase the value of the firm;

(2) Equity

financing is more value decreasing than debt or preferred
stock financing;

(3) Debts which are convertible to stock

carry a gr eat er negative impact than those which are not
convertible;

and

(4)

Industrial firms suffer more value loss

with external financing than do Utilities.6

4

For example, capital market prices provide vital signals
for corporate investment decisions

5

Increase or decrease in the value of the firm is measured
using abnormal return associated with the announcement of
such o ffering around the event date.

6

For details of the empirical researches please refers to:
Asquith and Mullins (1986), Kolodny and Suhler (1985),
Masulis and Korwar (1986), Mikkelson and Parch (1986),
Schipper an d Smith (1986), Pettway and Radcliff (1985),
Linn and Pinegar (1985), Dann and M i k k e l s o n (1984), Eckbo
(1986) .
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The following is a review of the theories on the
impacts of financing decision on the market reaction to
seasoned equity offerings.

A: Seasoned Equity Offerings & Information Asymmetry

In 1984, Myers and Majluf presented the seminal paper,
"Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms
Have Information That Investors Do Not Have".

The model

developed therein overwhelmingly supports the findings of
existing empirical researches.

The model holds that equity

financing always has negative consequences due to the
existence of information asymmetry between the management
and the existing stockholders with respect to the firm's
assets in place and with respect to the net present value of
the new investment project.
Under the theory of separation of ownership and
management7, the investors do not have direct access to the
inside information about the firm's assets in place as well

7

The concept of separation of Ownership and management and
the research work on this area can be traced back to as
early as Berle and M e a n s (1932).
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as to the net present value of the investment to be
undertaken through the new financing.

Management,

by virtue

of their inside position, possesses more information about
the value of the firm

(i.e.,

the assets in place)

the intrinsic value of new projects.
other hand,

as well as

Investors, o n the

learn about the value of the business and about

any new investment project through the market and from the
signals management provides from time to time.
In the Myers and Majluf model,

as new investment

opportunities become available, management will try to
maximize the wealth of current/existing shareholders.
faced with a new project,

If

the decision to issue equity to

finance the project conveys a signal to the market that
management feels the firm is overvalued in the market.
Investors, being aware of this behavior of management,

will

attempt to protect their own interests when a seasoned
equity issue occurs by re-valuing the stock,
a negative market reaction.

Thus,

thus leading to

according to Myers and

Majluf's Information Asymmetry Theory firms never issue
equity if it has the opportunity to use other means of
financing.
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The information asymmetry theory also suggests that
there exists a positive correlation between the level of
information asymmetry and the level of value drop in the
event of equity financing

(Dierkens,

1991). Based on Myers

and Majluf's information asymmetry theory,

Dierkens

(1991)

concluded that increases in the information asymmetry
between management and stockholders, will significantly
increase the drop in price of the stock observed at the
equity issue announcement.

A timing test

(Dierkens,

1991)

also showed that firms time their equity issue announcement
when the level of information asymmetry is relatively low.
In the extreme,

a fully levered firm should suffer minimal

value loss due to the absence of information asymmetry,
whereas,

a fully unlevered firm should suffer maximum value

loss due to the maximum level of information asymmetry.

B : Seasoned Equity Offerings & Growth Opportunities

While many empirical researchers confirmed Myers and
Majluf's prediction's concerning seasoned equity issues,
separate strand of literature challenges the model's

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.
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prediction of seasoned e quity offerings of always having a
negative effect on firm's value.
the Growth Theory literature,

Their argument is based on

where it is argued that

market's reaction to seasoned equity offerings is a function
of the issuing firm's level of growth opportunities when the
financing decision is announced.

Some researchers have used

the book-to-market ratio as a proxy for gro wth opportunities
of the firm, while most of others have u sed Tobin's Q as a
measure of firm's g r o w t h and/or growth opportunities.
While examining the market reaction to equity issue
announcements Barclay and Litzenberger

(1988)

found a

positive but insignificant correlation bet we en the
announcement returns of the issuing firms an d their Tobin's
Q ratios.

Kato and Sc ha ll h e i m

(1992)

found that the two-day

market model prediction errors for 63 Japanese public equity
announcements during the 1970s were on average negative,

but

the prediction errors were positive for the 113
announcements during the 1980s.

The book-to-market value

ratio for the respective two periods were 2.72 for 1970s and
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5.87 for 1980s, and both results were statistically
significant8.
D e n i s (1994)

reported that the equity issue announcement

effects are significantly negative for low-growth firms, but
not significantly negative for high growth firms.

The

findings are confirmation of the theoretical modification of
Myers and M a j l u f 's (1984)

model by Cooney and Kalay(l993).

The modified model shows that always-negative outcome of
equity issuance on the value of the issuing firm is a direct
outcome of Myers and Majluf's assumption that the net
present value of the project a firm is facing is always n o n 
negative.

In other words,

Myers and Majluf's model does not

allow for the most straightforward possibility that a firm
may not issue new equ it y just because all available projects
have negative net present value.

The modified model also

supports the view of Barclay and Litzenberger

(1988) who

argued that positive announcement effects are not merely a
noise.

Barcley and Litzenberger

(1988)

found that about 17%

of the stocks trading in the first 15 minutes after an
equity announcement had non-negative

8

(of which 7.8% is

It is important to mention that this finding is more just
merely the result of differential accounting practices in
Japan.
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positive)

returns.

had non-negative

During the next 15-minute interval,

(of which 26.7% is positive)

Using Miller and Rock's

(1985) model,

49%

returns9.

Pilotte

(1992)

argues that the stock price reaction to new financing
depends on the m a r k e t 1s imperfect assessment of the offering
firm's growth opportunities.
(1987)

Ambarish,

John and William

construct a model in which financing and dividends

convey information about the value of the assets in place
and/or the value of the growth opportunities of the issuing
firm.

They argued that for a mature firm the predominant

source of information is assets in place as their growth
opportunities are limited,
should be negative.

hence,

the announcement effect

For a rapidly growing firm the

predominant source of information asymmetry are the growth
opportunities,

9

thus,

the effect should be positive10.

As it is obvious that the variance of the daily returns
are much higher than 30-minutes return variance, it is
safe to conclude that the positive returns observed were
not merely the product of n o i s e .

10 Ambarish, John, and William (1987) assert that their
model correctly reflects the existing literature as most
of the studies only includes New York Stock Exchange and
American Stock Exchange and firms listed in these
exchanges are mostly mature firms.
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Jensen

(1986)'s Free Cash Flow Theory also supports the

argument of Ambarish,

John, and William's above argument.

Free Cash Flow Theory argues that the presence of free
cashflow reduces the value of the firm.

It is expected that

mature firms should have more free cashflow than the growth
firm due to their limited growth o p por tu ni ti es .
the cashflow,

The higher

the m ore likely that money will be spent

unwisely because,

agency theory suggests that managers

always have incentives for increasing the size of the firm
beyond optimum.

Therefore, when market sees that a mature

firm is expanding through equity issuance it reacts
negatively as such increase in the cash flow ma y cause the
increase in organizational inefficiencies.

On the other

hand an equity issue by a rapidly growing firm should signal
manager's intention of maximizing organization's wealth
through investment in new proj e c t .
Recent empirical works have produced some verydifferent results while examining the relationship between
issuing firms growth opportunities and announcement effect
of seasoned equity offerings.

Investigating the long term

performance of equity issuers, Gombala,

Lee, and Liu,

(1998)

observes that growth firms are performing poorly in the long
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run when compared to low-growth firms.

Their argument is

that overpricing is greater for the high-growth opportunity
firms than the low-growth opportunity firms, hence,

high

growth opportunity firms under-perform low growth
opportunity firms.
Safieddine,

In another recent work McLaughlin,

and Vasudevan

(1998) has documented that market

reaction to seasoned equity offering is more negative for
high growth opportunity

(Tobin's Q)

growth opportunity firms.

firms than the low

They argued that high growth

opportunity is associated with high level of information
asymmetry between the investors and managers,

and hence

leads to higher negative market reaction to seasoned equity
offerings.

They also argue that bigger firms have lower

level of information asymmetry than the smaller firms,
because for smaller firms fewer analysts follow the
company11.

11 Opler and Titman(1995) also used firms size as a pro xy
for information asymmetry.
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C: Seasoned Equity Offerings & Leverage

The impact of leverage on firm value is extensivelyanalyzed in the finance literature on Agency theory.

Apart

from the benefit of leverage through decreasing information
asymmetry between shareholders and managers,

and also the

minimization of the overall cost of capital of the firm as
addressed by the traditional finance theory,

a firm's debt

level may affect the ability of the firm to materialize all
possible future net present value projects.

Myers

called this problem as 'underinvestment p r o b l e m ' .
and Meckling

(1976)

(1977)
Jensen

called this the opportunity cost of not

being able to finance good investment projects,

i.e.,

'the

agency cost of debt'12,13.
One major implied assumption of Myers and Majluf's
(1984) model is that the firm making the equity issue

12 Discussion on this is restricted to the extend it is
relevant to the paper.
13 Agency theory suggest that there exist conflicting
interest between the insiders and outsiders(stockholders
and debtholders) of a firm. Jensen and M e c k l i n g (1976)
argue that unless the management holds 100% of the equity
of the firm, there exists sufficient ground to believe
that managers have incentives for not acting at the full
interest of the stockholders, (for more detail on the
subject please refer to Jensen and M e c k l i n g (1976)
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announcement is an unlevered firm, hence there is no agencycost of debt.
firms.

However, most firms in the market are levered

In levered firms,

potential stockholders,

in addition to existing and

there are creditors who also monitor

the activities of management,

then,

it can be argued that

the market has more information about the firm and it's
management's activity.

Thus,

the existence of debt in the

firm's capital structure decreases the level of information
asymmetry between the outside investors
and creditors)

and the management.

(both stockholders

Thus,

the greater is the

level of leverage, more is the level of monitoring,
therefore,

the lower is the level of information asymmetry

and vice versa.
Lang,

Ofek,

and Stulz

(1996)

explored the relationship

between leverage and future growth opportunities for all
Compustat firms over the period of 1970 through 1989.

j.ney

found that for firms with poor investment opportunities,
book leverage14 is strongly negatively correlated to the
various growth measures15.

Titman and Wessels

(1988), and

14 Calculated as book value of debt over total a s s e t s .
15 The growth measures used are Subsequent g r o w t h in number
of employees and Capital expenditure.
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Smith and Watts

(1992)

also documented a negative

relationship between the investment and/or growth
opportunities and firms leverage ratio.
Raymar(1993)

argues that an equity issue may be a

positive event when a firm has bonds outstanding.
argues that,

Thus,

he

financing n e e d not follow a pecking order in

which debt is the first choice of a quality firm.

His

reasoning for positive signaling is that "... a low-value
firm faces greater default risk than a high-value firm so
that its bonds have lesser value.

Although the low-value

firm may be able to issue overpriced stock,

it might instead

offer new debt if equity causes the value of old bonds to be
much higher.

The market would then view equity as a

favorable signal that the risky low-value firm would not
imitate"

(Raymar,

1994,

p322) .

Raymar then developed a

model where he examined a full set of possible outcomes in
the presence of d e b t .

He showed that in the presence of

sufficient degree of leverage and default risk a positive
market response is possible for equity issuance.
The issue of agency cost associated with equity
financing is strongly a ddressed by Jung,
(1996).

Kim, and Stulz

They argue that b y assuming the issuing firms are
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unlevered

(by the empirical research), the agency cost does

not go away.

Taking the assumption of Myers and Majluf's

unlevered firm,

Jung at el. argue that if the issuing firm

is unlikely to have valuable investment opportunities
low Q firms)

(i.e.,

then the news of managers making equity

announcement conveys the impression that the firm is faced
with unforeseen investment opportunity which managers can
not pass over,
of the firm

if they (managers) want to maximize the value

(i.e., maximizing the value of existing

stockholders).

In such cases,

the effect of such

announcement is

expected to be positive.

issue of age nc y

cost of managerial discretion is introduced

such issuance is no longer a good news,
a bad news.

It

rather it is more of

is likely that if the project is not a net

present value project managers
over debt,

But as soon as the

will prefer touse equity

because debt financing for a negative net present

value project reduces managers discretion over the firms
resources

(Jung et a l ., 1996).

More interesting is when the firm under consideration
is a levered firm.

McConnell and Servaes

(1995) concluded

that high-growth firm's corporate value is negatively
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correlated with leverage,

and for the low-growth firm the

correlation is positive.

Their argument is that if the

firms have plenty of growth opportunities then leverage will
force the firm to give up positive net present value
projects,

on the other hand if a firm's growth is low such

prevention will help to avoid manager's decision to take
negative investment projects.

Lang, Ofek, and Stulz

(1996)

also documented a negative relationship between the growth
opportunities of a firm and the leverage for the low growth
firms.

Therefore,

an examination of the impact of leverage,

by recognizing both negative and positive effect of
leverage, on the equity issuing firm's value change in the
market at the announcement of such issue should be able to
shed light on many of the unexplained parts of the previous
empirical works in this area.

Thus,

the main contribution

of this paper is the inclusions of issuing firms leverage in
the analysis of understanding the stock price behavior of
new equity issuance announcement.
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D: Seasoned Equity Offerings & Diversification

It is interesting to observe that researchers in the
past have not recognized the impact of corporate
diversification on explaining market reaction to seasoned
equity offerings.

The empirical evidence has already

established that diversification

(i.e.,

corporate structure)

has direct bearing on the value of a firm.
and Williamson

Weston

(1970),

(1975) argue that diversified firms are

capable of forming an internal capital market where the
internally gener at ed funds can be p oo l e d and allocated in
the most efficient way.

Teece

(1980)

argues that

diversification helps firms to achieve the economies of
scope and the economies of scale.
Stein

(1997)

In a very recent work,

argues that a diversified firms can efficiently

distinguish b etween a good division a n d a bad division and
then allocate the resources in the most appropriate w a y and
thus enhance the value of the firm.
Lewellen

(1971)

showed the benefit of coinsurance

through diversification and found that diversified firms
have a greater debt capacity then do non-diversified firms.
Chandler

(1977)

found that a Multi-divisional firm w oul d be
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able to create specialized divisions and thus benefit from
the inherent efficiency of task specialization.

Stulz

(1990) argues that diversified firms are capable of reducing
the underinvestment problem through the creation of a larger
internal market.

Shleifer and Vishny

(1992)

argued that

conglomerates will have a higher debt capacity because in a
bad state of the world they can sell assets in those
industries that suffer from liquidity problem.
Another great advantage of diversification is that
these firms are expected to have lower tax payments compared
to the sum of what they would have been paying as separate
entities.

M a j d and Myers

(1987) ment io n that taxes are paid

to the government if the firm's income is positive but does
not receive a refund if the firm incurs losses.

Even with

the introduction of loss carry forward provisions,

the tax

benefits of diversification have not be e n eliminated fully.
The arguments from the opponents of diversification are
getting stronger in the current finance literature.

These

researchers focus their arguments on the cost of
diversification to the firm.

Amihud a n d Lev

(1981) mention

that managers prefer diversification in order to protect the
value of their human capital.

Based o n Jensen

(1986)’s free
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'cash flow theory'

as well as

'agency theory'

researchers

argue that as managers always benefit from managing larger
firms.

Therefore managers of diversified firms,

are more

likely to indulge themselves in value decreasing investment
projects

(Berger and Ofek,

argument Meyer, Milgram,

1995).

Based on a similar

and Robert

failing firm, when standing alone,

(1992) argued that a
can not have a value less

than zero, but under the conglomerate structure,

the failing

firm may have a negative value.

The other division (s)

carrying the failing division(s)

will ultimately reduce the

value of the conglomerate.
The empirical evidence is also very strong against
diversification.

Except for Matsusaka

(1993)16

there is

very little empirical evidence that supports the benefit of
diversification.

Morck,

Shleifer,

and Vishny

(1990)

documented that the announcement of unrelated acquisition
results in a negative market return.
and Berger and Ofek

Lang and Stulz

(1994),

(1995) have found that diversified firms

trade in the market at a discount between 13 to 15 percent
compared to a portfolio of single segment firms in the same

16 M a t s u s a k a (1993) found positive bidder returns at the
announcement of conglomerate acquisitions in the late
1960s and early 1970s.
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industry17.

While examining the sensitivity of cashflows of

one segment to another,

Shin and Stulz

(1997)

found that the

cross subsidization among the segments is inefficient.
M y e r s o n (1982), and Harris,

Kreiebel, and Raviv(l982)

examined the information asymmetry cost between central
management and divisional managers in decentralized firms.
They concluded that information asymmetry costs are higher
in conglomerates than in more focused firm, since
information is more dispersed within the conglomerates.
Thus,

they argue that diversified firms are less profitable

than they w o u l d be if their separate lines of business would
operate independently.

17 A similar finding is also observed for Japanese and UK
firms(Lins and Servaes, 1997).
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III. THE ISSUES & HYPOTHESES

The empirical and theoretical investigations of equityfinancing and its impact on the value of the existing stock
price have concentrated ar ou nd the two main t h e o r i e s : the
Information Asymmetry The or y and the Growth Opportunity
Theory.

It is not clear w h y researchers fail to accommodate

the issuing firm's leverage level and corporate structure in
the understanding of the market reaction of the issuing
firms.

The objective of this study is to re-examine the

effects of seasoned equity issue announcements on the market
value of such firms from the levered firm's perspective and
also from the perspective of the corporate structure of the
issuing firm to understand the impact of such offerings.

A: Leverage, Growth, & Seasoned Equity Offerings

a)

The Impacts of Leverage & Seasoned Equ i t y O f fe ri ng s:

The term information asym me tr y here refers to the inequality
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of information about the firms' assets in place and the
inequality of information about the net present value of the
new investment between the managers and existing
stockholders.

The seasoned equity issue event not only

reflects the fact that the issuing firm is undertaking a new
investment,

but it also alters the issuing firm's existing

capital structure,
argued before,

(i.e., decreases the leverage ratio).

As

leverage has a negative association with

information asymmetry,

so an equity issuance will lead to an

increase in the level of information asymmetry for the
issuing firm.

If the firm is already a high-levered firm,

the level of information asymmetry of the firm before the
issue was lower than after the firm issued new equity.
Therefore,

the marginal increase in the level of information

asymmetry will be higher

(lower)

for the high-levered (low-

levered)

firm as the firm decreases its leverage level.

Dierkens

(19 91) concludes,

As

an increase in information

asymmetry will lead to a more negative valuation effect of
the high-levered firm's equity issuing decision,

HI:

If

the

leverage

information
dominates

asymmetry

the

market

thus:

impact
reaction
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seasoned

equity

offerings,

then

a

High-

Levered firm should experience greater value
loss

than

a

Low-levered

firm

at

the

announcement of a seasoned equity offering .

Leverage of a firm can also effect the future growth
opportunities of the firm (McConnel and Servaes,

1995),

and

thus effect the announcement day abnormal return of the
seasoned equity offering.

In the finance literature the

value of a firm is known as the discounted net present value
of the firms'

future investment projects.

As leverage

reduces the capacity of firms to materialize all possible
investment opportunities the value of the firm must also be
lower for highly levered firms.

As equity financing results

in the decrease in the leverage ratio,

such an action

increases the opportunity to materialize the future
investment projects,

and thus,

such an action should

increase the value of a highly levered firm at the
announcement of such issuance.
Moreover,

a highly levered firm's decision to issue

costly equity18 may well be the result of the fact that the

18 Equity issuance is a more complicated process, where,
under some circumstances managers m a y need to seek
permission from the existing e qu i t y holders. The process
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project the firm is facing is too good to pass over.
due to their high existing level of leverage,

And

the issuing

firms do not have the choice of using other methods of
financing.

Thus, by issuing equity,

a firm increases it's

debt issuance capacity in order to be able to undertake
future investment projects.

This also decreases the problem

associated with high leverage

(i.e.,

inability to capitalize

all future value increasing p r o je ct ).

Additionally,

the

firm is also signaling that it is faced with a good
investment project that can not be passed.
circumstance,

Under this

one should expect that such equity financing

should have a positive market reaction upon issue
announcement.
If the firm is unlevered19 or low-levered,

the marginal

value of increasing the opportunity to fund future positive
net present value projects is not as significant as it is
for the high levered firm.

Unlevered or low-levered firms

is also time consuming.
Whereas, the debt issuance is
faster and less complicated.
The timing aspect of
accepting investment project is so important that if
action is not taken in time then the project becomes
worthless.
This signifies the importance of debt (the
less time consuming process)
capacity in capitalizing
the future investment project.
19 As assumed in Myers and M a j l u f (1984).
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do not face the problem of foregoing the investment
opportunities if equity is not issued.

For these firms the

option to choose low cost financing through debt is
available.

Therefore,

for these firms,

the inability to

issue debt should be negatively viewed by the market as
management's inefficiency in choosing cheaper methods of
financing,

and hence should result in value decreasing

outcome of such announcement.

Thus,

leverage of a firms can

effect the market reaction to seasoned equity offerings
positively,

and this will happen when the growth impacts of

leverage is d o m i n a n t .

H2 :

If

Thus:

the growth impact of leverage dominates

the

market's

offering,

reaction

then

to

seasoned

High-levered

firms

equity
should

experience positive valuation effects at the
announcement of seasoned equity.

b)
Offerings:

The Growth Opportunities & Seasoned Ecruity
Understanding of the leverage impact of growth

would be incomplete without knowing the impacts of growth
opportunities on the announcement of seasoned equity
offerings. According to growth

(opportunity)

theory,
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firm possesses the quality of high growth opportunities,
this implies that the firm has a continuous flow of good
investment projects.

Thus,

the value of the firm must be

higher for high growth firms than the low growth firms.
The theoretical arguments in favor of positive impact
of growth opportunities on the value of the firms at the
announcement of equity issuance are very strong
Kalay,

1993),

Jensen

(1986)).

But unfortunately the

empirical findings are not that supportive
Litzenberger

(1988),

of the study by Denis

Pilotte

(Cooney and

(1992),

(Barclay and

D e n i s (1994)).

Results

(1994) documented a non-monotonic

positive relationship between announcement period prediction
errors and several ex ante measures of growth opportunities
by a small sample of younger,
Ambarish,

John,

and William

higher growth firms.

(1987), argued that firms listed

in the New York Stock Exchange and in the American Stock
Exchange are mostly mature firm

(which implies that these

firm's growth opportunities are limited).

Thus,

it is

argued here that the way previous empirical researches have
defined growth opportunities of a firm may need to be
adjusted to properly reflect the market view of growth
opportunities and/or existing growth level of a firm.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

30

Using information asymmetry argument,
work, McLaughlin,

Safieddine,

in a more recent

and Vasudevan

(1998)

has

documented that firm's with high Tobin's Q has more negative
reaction to seasoned equity offerings than low Tobin's Q
firms as high level of growth is associated with high degree
of information asymmetry
work Gombala,

Lee and Liu

(high growth opportunity)

(Smith and Watt,
(1998)

1992).

In another

argues that high Tobin's Q

firms are more over-valued in the

market than the low Tobin's Q firms.

Therefore,

market

reacts more negatively to the issue announcement by the high
Tobin's Q firms.
It is argued in this paper that other factors imbedded
in the growth opportunity proxy,
causing the negative affect.

i.e., the Tobin's Q, may be

The most probable cause could

be the fact that a low-growth opportunity firm's decision to
issue carries more marginal good information than that of
the high-growth opportunity firms.

As a result low-Tobin's

Q (low-growth opportunity ) firms have less negative impact
(market reaction)

than the high-Tobin's Q

opportunity ) firms.
the

(high-growth

For the low-growth opportunity firms,

arrival of good investment projects is not as usual as

it is for high-growth opportunity firms.

Thus,
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announcement, which itself is a good news,

creates a

marginal dominance of g o o d information in favor of lowTobin's Q firms.

H3 :

Hence:

Firms with high growth opportunity should
experience more value loss at the announcement
of seasoned equity offering than firms with
low growth opportunity.

C ) Simultaneous e f fect of Growth Opportunities & the
Impacts of L e v e r a g e :

The subsection

(a) of this section

implies that seasoned e q u i t y issuing firms existing leverage
level can effect the market reaction to such issue
announcements in either negatively
And the subsection

(HI) or positively

(H2).

(b) argues that the growth opportunities

of the issuing firm should have negative impact on market's
reaction to such offering.

Therefore to understand the

combined effect of g r o wt h opportunities and the impacts of
leverage,

examination nee d to be done from two perspective,

first: where the negative impacts of leverage is dominant,
i.e.,

the information asymme tr y aspect of seasoned equity

issue announcement is d o m i n a n t ( H I ) .

Higher the level of
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existing leverage more is the marginal increase in
information asymmetry due to the equity issuance.

For a,

the high growth opportunity firms, as it is argued before,
the marginal growth impact from the investment is not that
of significance.
al

(1998)

Additionally, as argued by McLaughlin et

the information asymmetry is higher for high

growth opportunity firms,
firms are also high

and the over-valuation of these

(Gombala et al 1998) .

Therefore,

it is

most likely that high growth firms with high leverage should
experience the most value loss at the announcement of such
offerings.

Thus:

H 4 : If

information

(HI) is dominant
firms

should

Asymmetry

impact

of

leverage

then high-levered high-growth

have

maximum

value

loss

at

the

announcement of seasoned equity offerings.

Second,
leverage,

from the perspective of growth impact of

i.e.,

firms with high leverage level will have

more positive gr o w t h impact at the announcement of seasoned
equity offerings.

If firms belong to the low growth
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opportunity group,

the arrival of a good investment project

is an unexpected event.

In view of that, the effect of

firms existing leverage level gets more interesting.

If

these low growth opportunity firms have high leverage,

then

an announcement of equity financing reflects several pieces
of 'news' : (1) the firm has unexpectedly found a positive net
present value investment project20, and if this project is
rejected,

the arrival of another project is uncertain,*

by issuing equity,
project,

(2)

the firm is not only financing a new

it is also creating a provision for future projects

without equity financing

(i.e.,

increasing the capacity to

finance future projects at less c o s t ) ;

and

(3) for these

high levered firms the equity issue decision is a foregone
conclusion,
level,

because, due to the existing high leverage

further debt financing is not possible.

is their only w a y to finance the project.

Equity issue

Therefore,

the

marginal cost of forgoing the investment project is
significantly higher for these firms due to the limited
growth opportunities.

Additionally,

the marginal growth

20 Empirical evidence in the finance literature has already
efficiently documented the impact of good and bad 'news'
on the value of the firm as well as the markets reaction
to such 'n e w s '.
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impact of these low growth opportunity firms are more
positive

The market, thus, will react positively

negatively)

(or less

to the announcement of seasoned equity offering

for these low-growth opportunity high levered firms.

H5:

Thus:

If growth impact of leverage (H2) is dominant the
high-levered low-growth firms should experience
the

least

value

loss

at

the

announcement

of

seasoned equity offerings.

B:

Corporate Structure & Seasoned Equity Offerings

Researchers have established that diversification
increases the asymmetry of information between the managers
and shareholders about the value of the firm
(1982) , Harris,

Kreiebel, and Raviv

(1982) ) .

(Myerson
They argue

that increased diversity makes it difficult for the
shareholders to get all the information about the firm as
efficiently as the managers of the firms.
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Apart from the information asymmetry issue there are
other factors that also contribute negatively to the value
of a diversified firm.
and Morck,

Shleifer,

Jensen

(1986), A mihud and Lev (1981)

and Vishny

(1990)

empirical evidence in support of the

have documented

'free cash flow' theory

arguing that managers p refer diversification in order to
protect their human capital.

In 1989,

Shleifer and Vishny

found evidence to support the argument that managers
diversify,

because through diversification they are capable

of making their skills more indispensable to the firm.
Proponents of diversification have argued that
diversification helps firm to raise capital at a lower cost.
As these diversified firms have debt capacities that are
higher than the non-diversified or focused firm

(Lewellen,

1977), market is surprised to see that these firms are
issuing equity instead of debt to finance investment
project.

Such action of a firm increases its'

investment problem'

'over

and /or problem associated with the

inefficiency of management.

Empirical evidences have

already established that equity issuance is a costly action
as well as a value decreasing event, when there is debt
capacity available the issuance of equity is certainly a bad
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news.

On the other hand,

its debt capacity,

if the firm has already exhausted

then the possibility of over-investment

becomes a concern to the outside investors.

In either cases

one should expect that the market reaction to seasoned
equity offering will always be negative for a diversified
firm.

Thus:

H6:

Diversified

firms

issuing

seasoned

equity

should experience a more negative reaction at
the

announcement

of

such

issuance

when

compared with non-diversified firms .

The discussion on the issue of corporate structure and
its impact on the seasoned equity issue announcements would
be incomplete if the discussion does not cover the impact of
the market's knowledge about the issuing firms past
structural change,

i.e.,

diversification level.

changes in the focus or
The most relevant structural change

in this context are the reduction of existing lines of
business through the selling of existing segments in order
to increase the focus, and/ or the acquisition of new
segments

to widen the corporate diversity and hence

reducing focus.
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Recent empirical work in this area has documented that
increasing focus is associated with increase in the value of
the firm (Berger and Ofek
Comment and Jarrell

(1995), John and Ofek

(1995)).

(1995)

This positive effect is due to

the markets understanding that these firms are now
selling of segments)

(after

capable of managing the corporation

more efficiently than before.
In this paper it is argued that in addition to the
arguments suggested in the literature,

there are other

factors that also contribute to the positive association to
such focus increasing activity to the value of the firm.
These firms, after taking divestiture action,

have more

assets in place to invest in future net present value
projects than before,

thus, are capable of maximizing their

value through not passing over good investment projects.
Therefore,

it is very likely that these firms should gain

value in the market,

as long as market value of a firm is

based on the discounted present value of the future
investment projects attainable to the firm.
But when these firms decide to go to the market in the
subsequent years of focus increasing activity,

the market

becomes suspicious about the activity of the management and

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

also becomes skeptical about the presence of positive net
present value in their future projects.

Additionally,

remains unclear why these firms are issuing equity,
they have good investment projects.

it

even if

If they have used the

funds collected from the sale of assets to pa y off debts
then they should have debt capacity outstanding.
have not u sed up their funds,
outstanding cashflow,

If they

then they should have

which should be used to finance the

new investment rather than issuing equity.

The market will

not become suspicious only when the firm has already spent
the funds on investments and now there is a genuine need for
new investment c a p i t a l .

H7:

If

the

Thus:

seasoned

firm

has

increased it's focus in the recent past,

then

the

such

amount

of

equity

negative

issuing

effect

of

issuance will be the largest.
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IV.

DATA & METHODOLOGY

A. DATA

The seasoned equity offerings from 1983 through the end
of 1994 were hand collected from the bi-annual publication

Investment Dealer’s Digest21.

The data collected from the

above source includes: the offering date,

the offering

price,

The financial year

and the number of shares offered.

end date for each firm was collected from the Wall Street
Journal Index

(WSJI)22.

with the WSJ I. 23.

These dates are then cross checked

If the issue is reported in the WSJI and

has a different offering date then the event date is changed
to the date reported in the WSJI minus one.

21 Until first half of 1988 the publication was called as
"the Directory of Corporate Financing" and from the
second half
of 1988 it is known as "The Corporate

Financing" .
22 Financial yearend dates are needed to align the financial
data from the Compustat, and to determine in which
financial year the particular issue is made.
23 It is important here to mention that the Wall Street
Journal Index does not report issue announcements as
often as it used to do until the first half of 80's.
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The WSJI generally reports different dates for an
offerings.

These dates are: The date of plan to offer; date

of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC); The offering date; The offering completion date; and
offering withdrawal date.
the primary source
Digest)

The offering date collected from

(publication of Investment Dealers

is used as the base24 date.

Initially,

4876 issue events were identified with the

criteria that the issue must be either a pure primary
seasoned issue

(henceforth Seasoned Issue)

of primary and secondary seasoned issue

(henceforth called

Combined Issue) offered at the same date.
called 'seasoned'
offering.

or a combination

An issue is

if the issue is not an initial public

Secondary issues are issues where existing block

stockholders sell significant portions of their holdings in
the open market25.

24 The reason it is called as base date is because paper do
not intend to include dates other than Offering
announcements in the event window.
It is found in the
Wall Street Journal Index that there are cases where a
plan to offer came two months, three months even six
months earlier, or registration for the offering was done
as early as three months earlier than the actual
offering.
It is also found that some of the reported
offer completion date is well after the initial offering
announcement.
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The following criteria were set for e ach event to be a
part of the sample for the reasons described below:
a: For the financial data, Compustat Annual data tape
of 1996

(hereinafter,

Compustat)

is used.

If the sample

firm is not in the data tape then events related to that
companies are deleted from the sample.
b: For market data,

the daily return data tape of the

Center for Research in Security Price
ending December 31,

1996 is used.

(CRSP)

for period

Abnormal return

calculation methodology requires that each sample event must
have return data for -187 days from event date up to +15
days from event date.

Sample events failing to meet these

criteria were also dropped from the sample.
C: In order to avoid the confounding effect,

those

sample events were deleted which have seasoned or combined
issues within the past 12 months or within the subsequent 12
months26of the event date.

In case of firms making multiple

25 Those combined offerings are dropped where the secondary
offering were not registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, because unregistered offerings are
expected to have different market impacts than registered
ones.
26 It is important here to recognize certain facts about the
Compustat annual data tape. First, Data tape do not
report the financial year end date for the reporting
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issues within the event period

(1983 through 1994)27 the

earliest event is first considered provided there is no
seasoned or combined offering in the past 12 months of such
offering.

For a second event to be considered in the sample

from the same company the event must be at least 12 months
apart from the first offering provided no similar offering
took place within the subsequent 12 month period.
d: To avoid possible information contamination around
the sample event date from offerings other than seasoned or
combined offerings
etc.)

(such as offering of debt,

convertibles

sample events we re also eliminated where such events

companies, rather it on l y reports the month of the
financial year end.
Second, Reporting year in the
Compustat is not same as financial year end (for more
detail please refer to Compustat User g u i d e ) . Telephone
discussion with Compustat revels that when a company/firm
change its financial reporting date, the financial data
reported in the Compustat does not reflect the annual
financial data for the surrounding years of such change.
Examination of several firms confirms the limitation.
Therefore, in order to avoid the chance of using n o n 
annual data for cross sectional analysis sample firm and
associated events were dropped if the firm has changed
its reporting date w i thi n the sample period.
27 The event period for the study is 1982 through 1995,
because each of the surviving sample firms fits the
criteria that no sample has similar event one year prior
or one year after the first event.
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(such as offering of debt,

convertibles etc.)

were present

within 3 0 days surrounding the sample event date.
e: Also deleted were those events associated with firms
which were not listed in the American Stock Exchange
or in the New York Stock Exchange
Market System

(AMEX)

(NYSE)or in the NASDAQ

(NASDAQ)28.

The above selection criteria brought the sample down to
1353 sample events for 984 companies over a period of 12
years

(1983 to 1994) .

Table 1 shows the sample collection

and elimination process.

[ Insert Table 1 about here ]

Table 2 shows the distribution of sample events and
sample firms by event year and by exchange listing,
by event year and b y the Industry29.

28

and also

A total of 807 sample

For exchange classification, Compustat data item
"Exchange Listing and S&P Major Index Code" (If the
Compustat exchange listing codes(ZLIST) are 01, 02, 03,
04, and 10 then firms are from New York Stock Exchange;
if codes are 05, 15, 16, 17, and 18 then firms are from
American Stock Exchange; and if codes are 21, 22, 23, 24,
and 25 then firms are from NASDAQ National Market
System.) was used.

29 In defining industry we used Compustat supplied Standard
Industry Classification (SIC) code.
If the first two
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events from 570 firms are from the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), 108

(76 sample firms) and 438

(338 sample firms)

sample events were from the American Stock Exchange
and the NASDAQ Market System
1353 sample events,

926

(NASDAQ)

respectively.

(715 sample firms)

the Industrial category and 236

(164 sample firms)

(105 sample firms)

For

events belong to

are from the Financial and Banking category.
191 sample events

(AMEX)

events

The balance of

belong to the Utilities

group.

[ Insert Table 2 about here ]

Sample events are grouped by the number of times the
issuer completed the

issue with in the sample

period

(hereinafter, Multiplicity of the Issue).

If the issuer

issued more than one

issue, then the issue

is identified as

'multiple'

those who issued once

in the sample

issue and

digits of the SIC code is 49 then we classify the firm as
Utilities,
if the first two digits are between 60 and 69
(both inclusive) then the firms are Financial and Banking,
and all others are classified as Industrial (Slovin,
Sushka, and Polonchek, 1992).
Appendix A contains the
distribution of sample events by the Two-digit Standard
Industry Classification (SIC) code for both total sample
and Segment s a m p l e .
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period are called

'single'

issue.

The justification for

this type of classification is that multiple issuers are
known to the market and the level of information asymmetry
about the firms value between the investors(market} and the
firms(managers)is much less than that of the single issuers,
who came to market for the first time.

It is expected that

the negative reaction to seasoned offerings will be
significantly less for the multiple issuers than the single
issuers.

On the contrary,

Thakor(1993)

developed a model

based on information asymmetry and argues that the negative
reaction to equity issuance,

in magnitude,

increases with

the increase in the frequency of prior equity issuance,
i.e., price reaction to cash stock piling is negative.
There are 753 sample events belongs to the single
issuer, of which 572 from the industrial sample,
from banks and 52 from utilities(table 3).

12 9 events

Out of 600

multiple issue events 3 54 events are from industrial group,
107 events from the banks and 139 events from utilities.
Interesting to notice that the proportion of multiple issue
is much greater for utilities than any other group.

[ Insert Table 3 about here ]
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Samples were also grouped by the type of the issue:

if

the primary seasoned equity issue is associated with a
secondary issue then those are identified as 'combined'
issue and if not then those are identified as
issue.

'primary'

It is argued in the literature that secondary

offerings are associated with negative market reaction
(Johnson, Serrano,

and Thompson

(1996)),

therefore,

it is

expected that combined issue events should

result in more

negative reaction than the primary

Out of the total

sample events,

issue.

970 of the events were Primary issues and 383

events were Combined issues

(Table 3).

Combined issue

events for Financial and Utilities were relatively fewer
then Industrial firms.

The total number of Primary issue

events for the Industrial group is

58 9 events and the same

for the bank and utilities are 202

and 179 events

respectively.

The number of Primary issue event is more

than the combined issue events in all sub-groups.
Table 4 contains the descriptive statistics of the
overall sample events showing the mean and the median.
Other variables included in the tables are: properties of
issue events such as,

issue price,

issue size adjusted by
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the market value of the assets,
firm,

leverage of the issuing

firms' growth measures such are Tobin's Q, 1-year and

3-year growth in return on sales,
performances,
(ROA).

and the firms measures of

like, return on sales

(ROS) , return o n Assets

Other variable includes in the table are market

value of assets,

and cash flow to total assets.

[ Insert Table 4 about here ]

In order to analyze the impact of diversification on
the market value of seasoned equity offerings firm
additional data have been collected from the Compust.at
PCPLUS for 199630 .

From this source two sets of d a ta is

gathered to identify the level of diversification of the
sample firms.

Collected data are:

Industry Classification)
each four-digit SIC code.

four-digit SIC

(Standard

code and the reported sales by the
It is important here to mention

that Compustat only carry segment data for past seven y e a r s .
Therefore,

analysis in this regard is restricted between

1989 and 1994.

Due to this limitation 794 sample events

30 Author gratefully thanks the business library of College
of William and Mary for their generosity in letting him
use their data source.
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were lost.

Additional 9 sample events were also lost due to

non availability of segment information for the last
of the seasoned equity issuing firms.

Thus,

year31

the final

number of sample events for analyzing the impact of
diversification drops to 550 sample events32.
Panel A of Table 5 shows the distribution of segment
sample events as they are grouped by the multiplicity of the
issue

(i.e., single and multiple)

issue(i.e.,

Primary and Combined)

and by the type of the
in different exchanges.

Panel B contains the same information for different industry
categories.

Out of total 550 sample events,

Primary issues,

382 events were

and 168 events were Combined issues, and 3 05

sample events were Single events, and 245 were Multiple
events.

The total number of Primary issue events for

Industrial group is 244 events and the total number of
single issue events is 227 events.

The num be r of single

events surpass multiple events in all categories,

similarly,

31 The term 'last year' refers to that financial year which
is immediately preceding the event date, an d where the
issue event is NOT included in the financial data.
32

op. cit. Table 1.
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the number of Primary issue events is more than the Combined
issue events in all sub-groups33.

[ Insert Table 5 about here ]

Table 6 reported below contains the descriptive
statistics of the primary variables for the last year used
in the segment sample e v e n t s .

[ Insert Table 6 about here ]

B. METHODOLOGY

a) Event S t u d y :

Figure 1 represent how the daily returns are used in
calculating the estimated of normal returns and excess
return for each sample e v e n t .
the event time.

The event day is the day 0 in

The estimation period is t = -162 to -36

33 This is due to the sample selection process used in this
study, where similar issue events within one year of
event day is dropped.
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relative to the event d a t e ( day 0) is used to calculate
(estimated) the normal return of the event window,
a

31 day period

(-15 through

+15 relative to

which is

event d a y ) .

[ Insert Figure 1 about here ]

The market model is used to estimate normal or expected
returns of the common stocks of the sample events.
ordinary least squares model,

In this

returns on a given security

are regressed against the concurrent returns of the m a r k e t .
The Center for Research on Security Prices

(CRSP) equally

weighted index is used as a proxy for the market Portfolio.

Rj t

=

+ Pj^rnt + ^ j t

Where,
t

= day measured relative to the event,

RjC

= return on security j on day t,

Rmt

= daily equally-weighted index for all

common

stocks on NYSE & AMEX and NASDAQ

firms on the

CRSP tape on the event date t (a

proxy for the

market portfolio of the risky assets)
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ctj

= estimated period intercept of firm j

Pj

= Ordinary Least Square

(OLS) estimates34 of firm

j 's market model p a r a m e t e r s .
Ejt

= the error term of security j on the sample event
day t

The abnormal returns for
difference between the actual

the sample event is the
returns on itscommon

stock

and the contemporaneous expected return generated b y the
market m o d e l .

The abnormal returns(AR)

event j on day t is

obtained

=

for each sample

as f o l l o w s :

~ C®j “ Pj^mt )

Where
t

= day measured relative to the event,

AR jt

= excess return to security j for day t,

Rjc

= return on security j during day t,

34 Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) has maintain that the above
methodology may create a potential for bias of the
Ordinary Least Square(OLS) estimate Pj, due to
nonsynchronous trading and infrequent trading in the
estimation period.
In order to correct such biases
Scholes an d William (1977) suggested methodology is
adopted to calculate the OLS estimate Pj
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R^

= daily equally-weighted index for all
common stocks on NYSE & AMEX and NASDAQ firms
on the CRSP tape on the event date t (a proxy
for the market portfolio of the risky assets)

ctj

= estimated intercept of firm j

Pj

= OLS estimates of firm j's market model
par am et er s.

D a i l y abnormal or excess returns are calculated for
each sample
sample of

event in the study over the event window.
N sample event,

For a

the daily average abnormal return

for each day t is estimated as

N

ARt =

XARjt/N
7-1

The expected value of A R jt. is zero by definition.

Analysis of statistical significance of the abnormal
returns calculated above requires the standardization of
abnormal return to reflect statistical errors in the
determination of expected returns.

To determine whether the
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average daily abnormal return is statistically significantly
different from zero,

the average standardized abnormal

return(ASARt) is calculated as

ASAR, = 1/ JV]T AR„ / S„
/=!

Where,

A
.

1

(A»f —

Sf 1+ —T + -£
T

Rm

/

—

i-1
and

S

= Standard error of the forecast for security j
in period t in the event period;
= The residual variance for security j from the
market model regression;

N

= The number of observations in the estimation
period;

i?m

= The average return of market portfolio for the
estimation period
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/?„,

= The returns on the market portfolio for the
day t

R„,

= The market return for period j within the
estimation period;

T

= Number of periods employed in the regression
equation for parameter estimation

T

(126 d a y s ) .

= Number of periods in the event window/period
(31 d a y s ) .

I

= Sub-script for estimation period.

J

= Sub-script for the event w in dow/period.

Assuming the normality and the independence of the
distribution of the calculated abnormal returns the tstatistics of the estimated parameters were calculated for
each days a s :

t= yjN(ASARi)

The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)

for each security

j , CARj, is calculated b y summing average abnormal returns
over the event period as follows:
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C-AR, K L — ^ ARjt
i=K

Where the C A R j>K>L is for the pe ri od from t = day K
until t = day L.
The cumulative average abnormal returns(GAAR)

over the

event time period from day K to day L are calculated as

CAARk l —

j] CARj'KL
M

1

Then average of the above standardized cumulative
abnormal return over the interval K to L are obtained as
follows:
a^ a- An
V” ASARk ,
ASCARK, = Y .
KX Y J K - L + l

Finally,

the t-statistics for the average standardized

cumulative abnormal return were calculated using the
following formula:
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t(ASCARK l) = yjN(ASCARK L)

For the purpose of this analysis the only Cumulative
abnormal returns were calculated for three days around event
day by summing the abnormal returns of event day minus one
day, event day,
CAR-i.+i*

It:

and event day plus one day, and is called
observed in the preliminary examination of

abnormal returns of the sample events that abnormal returns
around the three days of event day is consistently
significant in all the sub-groups of the sample35.

b) Cross Sectional Regression A n a l y s i s :

A cross sectional analysis was employed in the study to
identify the relationship between the identified variable
with the dependent variable.

The dependent variables are

CAR0 0 and CAR_1>+1 and the main independent variables are:
Tobin's Q as a measures of growth opportunities,
ratio, market value of assets,

leverage

cashflow to total assets,

35 5 -days cumulative abnormal returns are also calculated to
get some additional insight of the results.
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size of the issue adjusted by the market value of the
assets, and dummies for the sub-group of sample.

In the

segment sample additional independent variable Herfindahl
index and dummies for the focus level
focused)
focus)

and focus activity

(High-focused vs. Low

(Increase focus vs. Decreased

are used.

i) Tobin's O - Calculation & Its Use

In order to perform the cross sectional analysis,
study requires the understanding of firms'

this

investment

opportunities and its relation to Tobin's Q.

Tobin's Q has

been defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm to
the replacement costs of its assets.

James Tobin

(1969)

introduced this ratio in order to examine the causal
relationship between Tobin's Q and investment.
that if, at the margin,

He argues

Tobin's Q exceeded unity,

would have incentive to invest,

firms

since the value of their new

capital investment would exceed its cost.

It is clear that

if all such investment opportunities were exploited,
marginal value of Tobin's Q should tend toward unity.
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In the finance literature Tobin's Q has been used to
represent a number of diverse corporate phenomena,

such as,

cross-sectional differences in investment opportunities and
diversification decisions
Watson

(Malkiel, Von Furstenberg,

and

(1979)); the relationship between managerial equity

ownership and firm value
1995)) ; and Morck,

(McConnel and S e r v a e s , (1990 and

Shleifer,

and Vishny, (1988)) ; the

relationship between managerial performance and tender offer
gains

(Lang, Stulz,

and W a l k i n g (1989));

opportunities and tender offer responses

investment
(Lang, Stulz,

Walking,

(1989) ) ,- and financing, dividend,

policies

(Smith and Watts, (1992)) .

and

and Compensation

In this paper Tobin's Q is using to distinguish between
firms that have positive Net Present Value investment
opportunities and those that who do not.

High Tobin's Q

firms are those who possess positive investment project at
the time making seasoned equity offering and low Tobin's Q
firms are those who do not possess such opportunities.
The calculation of Tobin's Q as suggested by Tobin's is
practically impossible for the samples used in this studies,
due to non availability of replacement cost estimated for
the sample period.

The procedure used by Lindenberg and
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Ross

(1981),

hereinafter,

L-R to estimate Tobin's Q is very

complicated in terms of computational efforts and data
availability.

Chung and Pruitt

(1994) developed a simple

formula to approximate L-R's estimate of Tobin's Q.

Approximate Tobin's Q =

(MVA + PS + D E B T ) / T A

where
MVA36 =

Product of a firm's share price and the number
of common stock outstanding

PS=

= Liquidating value of firm's outstanding
preferred stock37

DEBT38 = Short-term liabilities net of short term
assets plus the book value of the firm's long
term d e b t .
TA39

= Book value of the total assets of the firm.

36 Product of Compustat date item #25 and data Item #199.
37 Compustat Data Item #10
38 Sum of Compustat data Item #5 and #9 minus data Item #4.
39 Compustat Data Item #6.
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The main advantage of Chung and Pruitt's method is that
(a) all data needed to calculate Tobin's Q is readily
available in the Compustat database, and

(b) this method is

capable of explaining 96.9% of the variability of the L-R's
method of approximating Tobin's Q.

For the purpose of this

paper thus, Chung and Pruitt's approximation is used.
Firm's leverage ratio is defined as the book value of
current liability plus long-term debt divided by the sum of
the book value of current and long-term debt,

market value

of common stock, and liquidating value of preferred stock
(Pilotte,

1992).

Appendix B contains the details of the

calculation of different variables to be used in the study.
Calculated Tobin's Q is then adjusted by using the
industry and exchange controlled median40 Tobin's Q in order
to group the sample by Q ratio.

The same step is taken for

grouping the samples by the leverage ratio41,42.

Event year

40 In calculating industry and exchange controlled median we
used all available companies in the Compustat data base
for 1996.
41 This papers' unique industry and exchange median is
motivated by the fact that finance researchers have
already recognized the structural and size differences
among the firms listed in the New York Stock Exchange,
the American Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ market system
(Ambarish, John, and William, 1987).
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is defined as the financial year within which firm made the
equity issue announcement.
'last year'43 (i.e.,
relevant year.

For the purpose of the study the

the year before the event year)

Because,

is the

this is the year where the issue

event's impacts on accounting numbers are not incorporated.
In other words,

the grouping of the samples are made based

on last year's Tobin's Q, and /or leverage ratio.

ii) Herfindahl Index - Calculation & Its Use

Net sales44 based Herfindahl index45 (HI)

is used in

this study to measure the level of focus /diversification of

42 Industry and Exchange median adjusted Tobin's Q, book-tomarket or leverage ratio is calculated by subtracting the
industry and exchange adjusted median value of the
respective variable from the actual value for the firm,
e.g., adjusted Tobin's Q of firm X is calculated as
Tobin's Q of X for year t minus industry and exchange
adjusted median Tobin's Q for the y e ar t.
43 op. cit. Footnote #32.
44 This item represents gross sales(the amount of actual
billings to
customers for regular sales completed
during the period) reduced by cash discounts, trade
discounts, and returned sales and allowances for which
credit is given to customers, for each industry segment.
For more details please refer to Compustat user's manual.
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the issuing firms.
(PCPLUS)

Net sales are reported in Compustat

for each segment only if the segment sale is at

least 10% of the total sales.

A net sales based Herfindahl

index reflects the degree to which revenues are concentrated
in just a few of a company's business segment,

and

calculated across n business segments as the sum of squares
of each segment i's sales,

Si, as a proportion of total

sales:

h c = ! - ! . ! ( s ic / z Blml s ic )2

Where Ht takes values between zero and o n e .

The closer

Ht is to one, the more concentrated are the firm's sales
within a few segments,
operations.

and hence the more focused its

High focused firms are those w hic h have Ht in

the event year greater than the industry adjusted median
Herfindahl index,

and rest are called low focused or

diversified firms.

4S Compustat only reports sales based on four-digit SIC,
therefore, our calculation of Herfindahl index is a four
digit SIC code classification based measure.
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Table 7

(panel A) shows the distribution of segment

samples b y exchange listing and industry classification and
by the level of diversification - high-focused and lowfocused.

Panel B contains the grouping the segment samples

by the diversification/focus activity of the sample events
over the last three years.

If the firms has increased focus

in the past two year over the preceding year then those are
identified as focus-increased firms, on the other hand,

if

the firms has decreased the focus successively over the last
two year then those are identified as focus-decreased firms.
Sample does not fall into this categories are dropped from
the sample to facilitate a better comparison between the
market reaction to seasoned equity offering by the group in
this sub-section of the study.

[ Insert Table 7 about here ]
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V.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

A; Analysis of Abnormal Returns

Table 8 contains the average abnormal returns on the
event date

(CAR0 0 ) , cumulative abnormal return for 3-days

around the event-date

(CAR.lrl) , and cumulative abnormal

returns for 5-days around the event date
their

respective t -s ta ti st ics .

(CAR_2 2 ) along with

In the overall sample it is

found that the average abnormal return for the event day is
-0.8416%

(t=-ll.8163).

The cumulative abnormal returns for

the 3 -days around the event day(-l thorough +1)
(t=-l.93871)

is -2.1626%

and for the 5-days around the event d a y (-2

thorough +2) is 2.4328%

(-1.70849).

Previous empirical work

has reported that the average two-day abnormal return for
seasoned equity offerings around the event date is about 3.1% for Industrial firms46.

Event day and cumulative

abnormal returns observed in this study are lower than what

Source: Asquith and Mullins (1986), Kolodny and Suhler
(1985), Masulis and Korwar (1986), Mikkelson and Parch
(1986), Schipper and Smith (1986).
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is reported in previous empirical works.

The most plausible

reason is that the sample period covered in this paper is
different from other empirical works.

Additionally,

this

paper's sample filtration to isolate the impacts of
individual seasoned equity offerings from other seasoned
equity offering as well other related offerings may have
caused the lower event day abnormal return and 3 -days
cumulative abnormal returns around the event date47 as
compared to what is found in previous work.

[ Insert Table 8 about here]

The reported t-statistics on table 8 are highly
significant for all categories.

Table 8 also reports the

percentage of positive returns on the event date.

These

numbers are relatively high when compared with those
reported occasionally by previous researchers in this area.
The percentage of positive response on the event day for the

47 To the best of the authors knowledge no other empirical
has done this much extensive filtration to select the
individual seasoned equity offerings
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overall sample is 34.885%48.

The same percentages from

previous empirical works ranged between 19% and 27% for
industrial firms.

The apparent reason is that due to more

stringent filtration,

some higher negative abnormal return

producing sample events may have been dropped out from this
study.
The table also contains the breakdown of the abnormal
returns b y the type of industry.

The event-day and 3 -days

cumulative abnormal returns for the industrial firms are 0.97866%

(t = - 9.6227). and -2.49151%

(t=-14.4787434)

respectively49.
When the sample is grouped by the exchange listing of
the events it is found that samples listed in the American
Stock Exchange(AMEX)

and NASDAQ market system have more

negative abnormal returns at the announcement of seasoned
equity offerings when compared with the issues listed in the

48 The percentage for Banks is 41.949%, for Industrial firms
the percentage is 33.153%, and for Utilities the
percentage is 34.5b5%.
49 For the Banks the event-day and 3 -days cumulative
abnormal returns are -0.61584%(-4.223236) and -1.74887%
(t=-7.0944853), and for the Utilities are -0 .45605%(t=3.87064) and -1.0793% (t=-5.33169668) respectively.
The
findings of relatively lower abnormal returns for Banks
and Utilities are consistent with the empirical findings
of Polonchek, Slovin and Sushka (198 9)
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New York Stock Exchange(NYSE).

This finding does not

support the argument placed by Ambarish,
W i l l i a m (1988),

John, and

that issues listed in the AMEX and in NYSE

are mostly mature firms and should experience more value
loss than the firms listed in the NASDAQ market system as
firms listed in the later are mostly rapidly growing f i r m s .
The finding of a greater negative market reaction for the
firms listed in the NASDAQ system indicates that there are
other factors beyond growth opportunities which are
contributing toward the market reaction to such offerings50.
It is expected in this paper that the multiple issuers
should experience less negative effects as the market has
better information about the issuers.

Investors in the

multiple issue events are less uncertainties about the
company and its activities as compared to the investor in
single/ first time issues.

Analysis in this paper shows

that the mean abnormal return difference between multiple
issuers and single issuers is not statistically
significant51.

But the magnitudes of the results are in the

50 A similar conclusion is drawn by D e n i s (1994).
51 Important to report that individual groups event day
abnormal returns are statistically significant at all
c onvent i ona1 1eve1.
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same direction of earlier argument,

i.e.,

the market favors

experienced firms but not at any significant level at least
for the overall sample.

These findings remain consistent

among industrial classification as well as categories of
exchange listing.
T-test results

(not reported in the above table)

also

indicate that if the issue event is associated with a
secondary issue on the event date

(i.e., combined issues),

then the issue causes significantly greater value loss to
the firm than if the issue had been made independently
(i.e., primary i s s u e s ) .

When a primary issue is associated

with a secondary issue that implies that the block holders
of the stock are also selling their stocks while the company
itself is trying to sell more stocks in the market.
Negative pressures are coming from two forces:

(1) more

stocks are available in market - an over-supply of st o c k s ;
and

(2) blockholders(who are generally believed to have

inside information)

intentions to sell their stock could

bear a negative news about the issue as well as about the
firm.

When the results were examined by the industry

classification and exchange listing of the issue,

it is

found that the mean abnormal return difference between the
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primary and combined issue is statistically significant for
the industrial samples and also for the firms listed in the
NASDAQ market system.

Thus the conclusion is drawn that in

determining a NASDAQ listed industrial firm's market
reaction to seasoned equity offering,
is an important d eterminant.

the type of the issue

The market reaction for a

combined issue is significantly more negative than that of
the primary i s s u e .

a) Abnormal Return & the Impacts o f Leverage

In order to test hypothesis one

(HI)

(H2), developed earlier in this paper,

and hypothesis two

sample events were

classified b y the level of issuing firms existing leverage
level
year

(Table 9).
(i.e.,

If the issuing firms leverage on the last

the year before the issue event took place)

is

greater than the industry and exchange adjusted median
(calculated using all the available firms in the Compustat
database)

than the firms were considered to be high-levered

firms. The remaining firms are classified low-levered firms.
Out of 1353 sample events,

687 sample were identified as
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high-levered issue events and the rest
levered events.

(666 event)

as low-

The event-day abnormal returns for the two

group were -0.779306% and -0.901994% for high-levered firms
and low-levered firms respectively.

The mean abnormal

return differences between the two group is not
statistically significant.
reported in the table)

The mean leverage level

(not

for the two groups was 0.137298 for

the low-levered group and 0.397949 for the high-levered
group,

the differences between the mean of leverage ratio is

statistically significant.
hypothesis one(HI),

i.e.,

These results fail to support
that high-levered firms lose more

value at the announcement of a seasoned equity offering.
the other hand,

the support for hypothesis two(H2)

statistically significant.

On

is not

This implies that the results do

not show that the market's reaction to seasoned equity
offerings of high-levered firm is better than the lowlevered firm.

[Insert Table 9 about here]

The sample events are then examined by the industry
classification and also by the exchange listing of the issue
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event.

There are no significant differences between low-

levered firms and high-levered firms among any of the s u b 
groupings by industry classification or b y exchange listing.
Even when the sample events were grouped by the type of the
issue and by the multiplicity of the issue,
not reveal any significant differences.

results also do

Although the mean

abnormal return differences are not statistically
significant,

the results in the table 9 reveal that in

general high-levered firms are performing better than lowlevered firms,

thus shows sign for favoring the growth

impact arguments of leverage as outline in hypothesis two
(H2) 52,53 .
For the Industrial sample events it is observed that
exchange listing is not a factor that contributes toward the
differences in abnormal return between the high-levered and
low-levered firms,

neither does the types of the issue or

52 Out of the t e n (10) different groupings of sample events
se v e n (7) groups supports in favor of hypothesis two,
i.e., growth argument and the rest 3 (three) group
supports hypothesis one, i.e., information asymmetry
argument on the event-day abnormal return.
53 Therefore, it is warranted that the growth impact of
leverage need to be addressed along with the growth
opportunity argument to understand the impacts of
leverage and Tobin's Q in market's reaction to seasoned
equity offerings
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the multiplicity of the issue

(Table 10) .

table 10 that in the overall sample,

Also observed in

events listed in NYSE

and AMEX the dominance of information asymmetry impact of
leverage is visible,

i.e., high-levered firms lose more

value at the issue announcement due to the high marginal
increase in information asymmetry

(HI).

Whereas,

issues

listed in NASDAQ shows less negative abnormal returns for
high-levered firms,

which supports the growth impact of

leverage hypothesis

(H2) .

view of Ambarish,

John,

Thus the results supports the

and William

(1987) 's that the

announcement effect for the firms listed in the NASDAQ
market, which are most ly growing firms,
of growth.54.

should be a function

Results show support for both hypotheses

(HI

and H2) for different sub-categories of sample event.
Whether the information asymmetry impact of leverage or the
growth impact of leverage is dominant depends on the issue
characteristics of the event.

[ Insert Table 10 about here ]

54 Result remains consistent when 3 -days cumulative abnormal
returns were used in the analysis.
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Results in Table 10 indicate that firms listed on the
NYSE carried significantly different abnormal returns with
the announcement of seasoned equity offerings between lowlevered firms and high-levered firms when sample are further
classified between the single issues and multiple issues.
It affirms the argument that for multiple issuers,

the

market is already aware of the firms growth and growth
related information through past experience,

so the

uncertainty about the issue event become the dominating
force in controlling the announcement effect.

Thus,

results

support the information asymmetry impact of leverage
hypothesis

(HI).

For the single issuers the story is

different,

the market does not know muc h about the firm's

growth related opportunities of the firms as well as that of
the event itself.

Therefore,

the growth impact of leverage

becomes the dominating force, and as observed in this study,
high-levered firm's market reactions is less than the lowlevered firm for these samples,
hypothesis

(H2).

and hence supports the

It is important to note that in both cases

the abnormal return differences between high-levered and
low-levered firms are statistically significant.
findings supports bot h hypotheses

(HI and H2)

Thus,

and also
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recognizes the fact that the market's reaction to seasoned
equity offerings depends upon the nature of the issue.

b) Abnormal. Returns & Growth Opportunities

Like most of the previous empirical works,
this paper is measured by calculating Tobin's Q.

growth in
Although

this study uses an abridged version of original Tobin's Q
due to lack of data,

the descriptive statistics of Tobin's Q

shows that the calculated Tobin's Q used in this study is
very similar to what has been used in other empirical works.
The descriptive statistics of the Tobin's is listed in table
11.

It is observed that mean and median Tobin's Q for the

overall sample and for all of the categories are very high.
This implies that issuing firms are firms with ample growth
opportunities.

To isolate the relatively high-growth

opportunity firms from the relatively low-growth opportunity
firms this paper used a more restrictive growth
classification.

In this paper high growth opportunity firms

are those which have Tobin's Q greater than one, as well as
a Tobin's Q greater than the industry and exchange-adjusted
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median Tobin's Q.

This classification produces a mean

Tobin's Q for low growth opportunity firms of 0.590849,

and

that for the high growth opportunity firms of 2.292758.

[ Insert Table 11 about here ]

Theoretical arguments suggest that a high-growth firm's
growth opportunities minimize the value loss associated with
the announcement of seasoned equity offerings.

However,

empirical studies on seasoned equity offerings shows little
evidence that high growth firms benefit from seasoned equity
offerings.

Table 12 contains the results of event day

abnormal returns of the sample events grouped b y high-growth
opportunity firms and low-growth opportunity firms.

Results

indicate that there are significant differences between
high-growth and low-growth firms in event-day a n d 3 -days
cumulative abnormal returns for the overall sample.

But

most importantly is the result that high-growth opportunity
firms' market reaction to seasoned equity offerings is
significantly more negative than that for the low-growth
opportunity firms.

The results are consistent even when the

samples are regrouped by the industry, or by the exchange
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listing of the events, or by the type of the issue,
the multiplicity of the issue.

Thus,

or by

the overall results

supports the marginal growth impact argument

(H3) developed

earlier in this paper.

[ Insert Table 12 about here ]

Table 12 also shows that a higher level of significance
in mean difference between abnormal returns between for
different g rowth opportunity levels exists in the sample
group of industrial firms,
market,

firms listed in the NASDAQ

in the combined samples and in the sample consists

of single issuers.
pattern i.e.,

Other sample groups also show a similar

high-growth opportunity firms losing more

value than the low-growth opportunity firms,
are not statistically significant.

but the results

Results are also

consistent in 3 -days and 5 -days cumulative abnormal return
except for the NYSE listed samples in 3 -days cumulative
abnormal return.

These findings are in sharp contrast to

the popular belief that growth opportunities plays a
positive role in determining the announcement effect of
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seasoned equity offerings,

but overwhelmingly supports the

validity of hypothesis H 3 .
In order to explain the inconsistency of this paper's
findings with the previous empirical work it can be argued
that in a seasoned equity offering it may not be the growth
opportunities that is controlling the announcement
effects55.

It is argued in this p a p e r that other factors

imbedded in the growth opportunity proxy,
Q, may be causing the negative affect.

i.e.,

the Tobin's

It is likely that a

low-growth opportunity firm's decision to issue carries a
stronger positive marginal effect than that of the highgrowth opportunity firms.

As a result low-Tobin's Q

(low-

growth opportunity ) firms have less negative impact than
the high-Tobin's Q

(high-growth opportunity ) firms.

the issue announcement, which itself is a good news,

Thus,
creates

a marginal dominance of good information in favor of lowTobin's Q firms.
The results are consistent and more interesting when
the industrial sample is broken into different categories

55 Empirical evidences to date fails to show a significant
positive association between Tobin's Q and market
reaction to seasoned equity offerings in a consistent
way.
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based on exchange listing,

type of the issue and the

multiplicity of the issue.

As reported in table 13, out of

926 industrial sample events 501 sample events belong to the
low-growth opportunity group and rest of the 425 sample
events are in the high-growth opportunity g r o u p .

The

abnormal return differences between the two groups is
statistically significant at the less than 5% level.

Low-

growth opportunity firms experiences less value loss than
high-growth opportunity firms at the announcement of
seasoned equity offerings.
by the exchange listing,

Further break down of the sample

by the type of the issue and by the

multiplicity of the issue,

confirms the overall findings.

This finding is statistically significant at less than one
(1) percent level for the NASDAQ listed firms and marginal
significance

(less than 10%)

is observed for AMEX listed

firms.

[ Insert Table 13 about here ]

In the industrial sample,

when the sample is grouped by

the type of the issue, only combined issues show significant
abnormal return d ifferences.

No significant difference is
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observed in event day abnormal return between multiple
issuers and single issuers
ta b l e ) .

(results are not reported in the

But the direction of abnormal return differences is

consistent with that of the overall sample.

When the

abnormal returns of sample events are cross examined by
considering the exchange listing in conjunction with type of
issue and the multiplicity of the issue,

the

results remain

consistent except for the multiple issuer samples from the
NYSE56.

Thus,

the overall result strongly support the

negative effects of Tobin's Q, a support for H 3 . This
suggests that the marginal impact of financing decision on
high growth/ low gr o w t h firm are a determining factor in
assessing the market reaction to seasoned equity offerings.
To verify the consistency of the results observed
above,

the sample is further grouped b y the 75 percentile

and 25 percentile of industry adjusted median Tobin's Q and
then t-tests are performed on the differences in mean
abnormal return of the two groups.

It is found that the

56 In this group it is found that the direction of
difference is opposite.
This paper believes that
previous empirical work's observation of marginal
insignificant positive association between Tobin's Q and
event day abnormal return is the result of the influence
of these sample group in the total sample used in those
studies.
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results are consistent with results of the overall sample.,
i.e.,

the high growth firms performing poorly compared to

low growth firms

(results are not reported in the table) ,

and the results are statistically si g n i f i c a n t .
The above finding contradicts the arguments of the
existing literature and the findings of previous empirical
works.

It has been argued in the literature that high

Tobin's Q firms should experience less negative impacts at
the announcement of seasoned equity issue announcements.
But the findings of previous empirical works in this area
are inconclusive.

The statistically significant difference

between the gro w t h level observed in this paper is due to
the stricter grouping criteria for distinguishing between
high-growth firms and low-growth firms.

Such an action is

warranted due to the finding that o n average all seasoned
equity issuing firms carry a high level of Tobin's Q.

The

negative association between the g ro w t h opportunity levels
(Tobin's Q and abnormal return affirms the fact that market
reacts to the marginal growth impact of issue announcement.
That is,

the lower the level of Tobin's Q of firms more is

the marginal positive information
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c) Abnormal Returns and the Combined^.Ef fect of Leverage

and Growth ..Qpportuni ties •

This section is intended to test the validity of
hypothesis four

(H4) and hypothesis five

(H5) developed in

Issues and Hypotheses section of this paper.

It is observed

in this study that both the information asymmetry (negative)
impact

(HI)

and growth (positive)

impact

(H2) of the

leverage effect is present in the market reaction to
seasoned offering depending on the issue characteristics.
Additionally,

it is also observed in this paper that the

growth opportunity measure have a significant negative
association with market reaction to issue announcements
(H3).

This is because the market reacts not directly to the

growth opportunities but rather to the marginal growth
impact of such issue announcements.

As most issues have

high Tobin's Q ratio the marginal impact is greater for the
firms with relatively low Tobin's Q ratio.

Table 14 and table 15 contain the examination of eventday abnormal return and 3-day cumulative abnormal return of
seasoned equity offerings by the growth opportunity level of
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the samples and by the existing leverage level of the sample
to understand the combined effects of the two variables on
the market reaction to such announcements.

For the total

sample, event day abnormal returns are more negative for
high-growth opportunity firms than low-growth opportunity
firms across the board, but abnormal return differences are
significant only for the firms within high-leverage group of
samples.

Thus the findings are consistent with the previous

results.

[ Insert Table 14 about here ]

[ Insert Table 15 about here ]

When the samples are regrouped by industry, by the
exchange listing of the issue,

by the type of the issue -

primary and combined, and by the multiplicity of the issue single and multiple,
day abnormal return

significant differences in the event
(table 14)

are present between the high-

growth opportunity and low-growth opportunity firm for
industrial samples,

for samples listed in the NASDAQ,

for

combined issues and for single issues, when the existing
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leverage level of the firms are high

(high-levered f i r m ) .

Table 14 also indicates that for the high-growth opportunity
samples of industrial firms,

the event day abnormal return

difference between the high-levered firm and low-levered
firm is marginally significant.

Similar marginal

significant differences between high-levered firms and lowlevered firms is also found in the low growth opportunity
samples of Utilities.

Among all 20 subgroups,

only the low-

levered sample listed in the NYSE produces an insignificant
differences between the high-growth opportunity and lowgrowth opportunity firms in favor of high-growth opportunity
firms.

Table 15 also indicates that out of ten

categories of sample events 6

(10)

(six) of the least value loss

event occurs in low-levered group sample,

and the same

number for the low-growth opportunity firms is 7 (seven).
On the other hand,

7 (seven)

out of ten

(10) maximum value

decreasing events took place among the high-levered group,
and among 8 (eight)
group.

Thus,

amongst the high-growth opportunity

the findings of this paper supports the

theoretical prediction of the hypotheses

(H4 and H5)

Table 16 reports the results of the cross examination
of industrial s a m p l e s .

For the total sample there is
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significant support for the information asymmetry impact of
leverage - a support for hypothesis one
growth opportunity firms.

(HI) among the high

For the low-growth opportunity

firms there is an insignificant support in favor of growth
impact of leverage - a support for hypothesis two

(H2) .

When the sample is broken down by different categories,
findings remain consistent,
significant.

although not statistically

The only exceptions are found among low-growth

opportunity AMEX firms and among multiple issuer firms.
these cases,

the

In

the growth impact of leverage remains dominant.

[ Insert Table 16 about here ]

It is also observed in table 16 that event day abnormal
return difference between the high-growth opportunity firms
and low-growth opportunity firms is in favor of low-growth
opportunity firms,

that is, the low-growth opportunity firms

are losing less value at the announcement of seasoned equity
offerings.

The on l y exceptions to this finding is observed

in the low-levered categories among the sample from NYSE and
primary issuers.

In both cases the results,

statistically significant.

are not

Most of the significant results
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between the performance of high-growth opportunity firms and
low-growth opportunity firms are observed in the categories
of NASDAQ listed finns,
single issuers.

in combined issues,

For the AMEX listed firms,

and in the
the significant

difference between the impacts of issue announcements of
high-growth opportunity firms and low-growth opportunity
firms are observed among the low-levered group.
seven

Out of

(7) most value decreasing incidences, all seven

(7)

took place amongst the high-growth opportunity group and
amongst the high-levered group.
out of the seven

At the same time,

six

(6)

(7) least value decreasing events took

place in the low-growth opportunity group.
By re-examining table 16, where the industrial sample
of event-day abnormal returns are broken down by the
leverage level and the level of growth opportunity,
from the NASDAQ market system,

samples

from combined issues and from

single issues sub-group have the least value loss in the
low-growth opportunity high-levered group,
importantly,

and more

the return difference among the growth

opportunity levels is statistically significant in favor of
the low-growth opportunity firms in the high-levered group.
By recalling the growth impact of leverage

(H2), and the
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findings of this p ap er in section

(a) that NASDAQ listed

firms, and combined issues and issues by the single issuers
supports the hypothesis of growth impact of leverage

(H2),

it can be concluded that the hypothesis H5 is strongly
supported in this paper.

On the other hand,

strong support

for hypothesis H4 is also observed in the industrial s a m p l e .
All of the maximum value loss events occur in the highlevered high-growth opportunity s a m p l e s .

These results are

consistent with the overall sample results reported earlier.
In order to investigate,

further cross sectional regressions

on event day abnormal returns are performed in the following
section.

d) Cross Sectional Regression A n a l y s i s :

The event-day abnormal return is the dependent variable
in the regression analysis.
the leverage ratio

The independent variables are

(LEVRG), Tobin's Q

(T-Q) ratio,

the issue adjusted b y the market value of assets
Cashflow to total assets
value of assets

(L(MVA)).

size of

(ISUSIZE),

(CFTA), and the log of the market
The d u m m y TYPE takes a value of 1
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(one)

if the issue is a combined issue,

issues)

takes a value of 0 (zero).

else

(primary

The dummy variable MLTPL

takes a value of 1 (one) if the issue is a multiple issue,
otherwise it takes the value 0 (zero).
listed in the NASDAQ market system,

If the issue is

then dummy XNG1 takes a

value of 1 (one), otherwise it takes a value of 0 (zero),
and if the issue is listed in NYSE then the dummy variable
XNG2 takes value 1 (one), otherwise 0

(zero) .

Table 17 contains the results of the cross sectional
regression analysis.

The results for the overall sample is

produced in panel A, and in panel B only the industrial
samples are used.

The regression result for the overall

sample shows that Tobin's Q as an independent variable has a
consistently negative coefficient,

whereas,

not have any significant coefficients.

leverage does

But the sign for

both variables is consistently negative,

except for the

model where leverage is used independently.

This affirms

previous evidence that both leverage and Tobin's Q have a
negative association with issue announcements.
relative issue size variable
the model,

(ISUSIZE)

When the

is introduced into

the model's explanatory power - adjusted R-

squared(ADJ R-SQ)

increases substantially

(model-4), and the

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

88

issue size variable has a highly statistically significant
coefficient.

This is another indication that issue

characteristics have significant effect on the market's
reaction to seasoned equity offerings.

Other variables

introduction in the model do not improve the explanatory
power nor any of the estimated coefficients are significant.
The sign of the estimated coefficient for the dummy
variables for the type of the issue and for the multiplicity
of issue are in the direction expected in this paper.

That

is, combined issues add to the negative magnitude of the
market reaction, whereas,

multiplicity adds to the positive

magnitude of the reaction.
In panel B, where industrial samples are considered,
the results are quite different.

Both leverage ratio and

Tobin's Q ratio have negative significant coefficients
throughout the models.

The other significant independent

variable is the relative issue size, but the level of
significance for this variable drops successively as other
variables and dummies are introduced into the model,
specially with the introduction of the dummies for type of
the issue and the multiplicity of the issue.

These findings

confirm the arguments developed earlier that issue
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characteristics plays an important role in determining

the

magnitude of market reaction to seasoned equity offerings.
The insignificant coefficients for cashflow to total assets
(CFTA) and log of market value of assets

(L(MVA))

implies

that market already knows that these firms are high value
firms and the agency problem of free cashflow is not
present.

This argument is consistent with the previous

findings that samples'

Tobin's Qs are very high.

[ Insert Table 17 about here ]

d) Summary

The examination of the market reaction to seasoned
equity offering from the perspective of growth and leverage
is analyzed in the previous section.
section of this paper,

In the theoretical

several hypothesizes were developed

to explain the possible impacts of g rowth opportunities and
impacts of the leverage level of issuing firms.

Empirical

research on this area argues that if the issuing firm
possesses growth opportunities as measured by Tobin's Q,
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then the issuing firm should experience a positive,

or at

least less negative, market reaction to seasoned equity
offerings.

For the traditional growth opportunity theory,

there is practically no support in this study,
marginal support in the samples from NYSE57.

except for a

Previous

empirical research has documented that there are some
marginal support from offerings for very high growth firms.
The evidence in this paper shows that high-growth firms
consistently perform poorly at the announcement of seasoned
equity offerings and thus support the alternative view of
Tobin's Q as presented in this paper.

This paper,

thus,

argues that seasoned equity issuing firms are in general
high-growth opportunity firms
ratio), therefore,

(as measured by Tobin's Q

the marginal impact of issue announcement

is more positive for the low-growth opportunity firms than
the high-growth opportunity f i r m s .
The impacts of leverage on such issue announcement has
never been addressed directly.

The theoretical argument is

that a firms high leverage level can prevent the firm from
capitalizing all investment projects.

The p r o b l e m gets more

57 The only better performance b y high Tobin's Q firm is
observed in the sample from NYSE and only w h e n 3 -days
cumulative abnormal return is used.
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serious with the increase of leverage.

Additionally,

levered firms suffer from high bankruptcy cost.

high

Both of

these together should result in an under-valuation of firms
value,

and an undervalued firm should not issue equity

because that would cause more value loss to the firm.

Thus

a high-levered firm's equity issuance should produce a
negative market reaction.
This paper examines the impact of leverage from a
totally different perspective and argues for both
information asymmetry and growth impact of leverage and
looks into which of the two argument plays the dominant role
in determining the market reaction to seasoned equity
offerings.

Although the results are not statistically

significant when the impact of leverage is examined
independently,

it is observed that the support for a

particular hypothesis

(HI or H2) depends on the issue

characteristics of the sample events.

The sample from

industries listed in NYSE and in AMEX issuing only primary
issues by the multiple issuers favors hypothesis one
i.e.,

(HI),

the information asymmetry impact of leverage is

dominant, whereas,

other sample groups support the growth

impact of leverage

(H2).

But when the results are examined
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in conjunction with the growth opportunity measure

(Tobin's

Q) the consistency of the result affirms that leverage has
both negative and positive effect on the announcement effect
of seasoned equity offerings,

and the dominance of one over

another depends on other factors,

such as,

issue and issuer

related characteristics.
As the effects growth opportunities and leverage level
is examined simultaneously under hypothesis H4 and
hypothesis H5 developed in the paper,

it is found that high-

growth high-levered firms are the worst performer and the
firms with high-leverage and low-growth opportunity firms
have the least value loss at the announcement of seasoned
equity offerings.

Thus,

the results are consistent with the

predictions of hypothesis H4 and hypothesis H 5 .

The

consistency of the result remains present in both the
overall sample as well as industrial sample.
the validity of both hypotheses

(H4 and H5)

The finding of
also supports

the view expressed in this paper that issue characteristics
is also an important element in the market's reaction to
seasoned equity issues market reaction.

Cross sectional

regression results also confirm the above findings.
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B: Diversification & Seasoned Equity Offerings

a) Analysis of Abnormal Re t u r n s :

Table 18 presented below shows the event-day abnormal
return,

3 -day cumulative abnormal return,

and 5 -day

cumulative abnormal return of the sample selected for this
section of study.

There are 550 sample events where the

segment information was available from the data source,
i.e., Compustat PC PL US .

The sample was broken down by the

industry classification,

and then by the relative

diversification position

(i.e.,

focused)
issue.

high-focused and low-

of the issuing firm at the announcement of such
Sample events were also categorized by the where the

issuing firm has increased focus
of diversification)

(i.e., decreased the level

within the past two years

increased focused sample events)

(hereinafter,

and where firms have

decreased focus successively in the past two years58
(hereinafter,

decreased focused sample e v e n t s ) .

58 This grouping is more restrictive for the focus decreased
group than the focus increased group due the limited
number of sample events available and also to avoid data
overlapping between the g r o u p .
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[ Insert Table 18 about here ]

There are 67 sample events from the Banks,

3 90 events

from the Industrial group and 93 samples from the Utilities.
Of the total sample,

470 sample events belong to the low-

focused group, and 80 events are in the high-focused group.
High focused events are defined as those where the issuer
level of diversification as measured by Herfindahl Index
(HI) is greater than the median Herfindahl Index of the
overall sample adjusted by the industry classification of
the sample59.
For dividing the sample between increased-focus and
decreased-focus groups,

if a firm is not in the focus-

increased or in the focus-decreased group,
dropped in that part of the study.

then the event is

There were 34 samples

59 For further verification of the grouping other methods of
diversification/focus measures are also used b y using the
number of two-digits SIC code segments and number of
four-digit SIC code segments for the issuers.
When twodigit SIC is used 445 events were in the low-focused
group and 105 events were in the high-focused group, and
when four-digit SIC is used the numbers are 427 for lowfocused group and 123 events in the high-focused group,
but the pattern that most of the issuers are low focused
firms remains the same.
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that have decreased the focus level successively in the past
two years over the previous year, and 108 sample have
increased their focus either in the last year or in the year
before.

The t-statistics reported in the table 18 indicates

that all the abnormal returns are highly statistically
significant except for the focus decreased firms.
Table 19 contains the event-day and cumulative abnormal
returns differences between the low-focused firms and highfocused firms by the industry classification.

The number of

low-focused firms out numbered the high focused firms60.

It

is also observed from the table that for the sample from the
Banks group,

the high-focused firm's market reaction to the

seasoned equity offerings is less negative than that of the
low-focused firms61.

The 3 -days cumulative abnormal return

for the industries are significantly lower for the highfocused firm than the low-focused firm.

This results

supports the hypothesis developed earlier that high-focused

60 In order to verify this fact, firms which have only one
segments over the last three years have been taken off
from the sample, even in that case it is observed that
the proportion between the high-focused firms and lowfocused firms remains the same.
61 The limitation of Bank's sample events is that only 5
(five) out of 67 sample events are in the high-focused
group, which makes any stronger conclusion unwarranted.
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firms market reaction to seasoned equity offering should be
less negative

(H6) than that of the low-focused firms.

The

reason being that high-focused firm are viewed by the market
as more valuable,

as these firms have lower level of

information asymmetry due to less diversity in their
corporate stru c t u r e .

[ Insert Table 19 about here ]

The maximum value

losses are observed for the low-

focused industrial firms and least value losses for the
high-focused industrial firms.

Thus it is apparent that the

level of firm focus or diversification matters more for
Industrial firms than Banks or Utilities.

The impacts are

more favorable in favor of high-focused firms than lowfocused/diversified firms.
The sample was then grouped by the category of f o c u s increasing and focus-decreasing firms in table 20.

The mean

of the abnormal returns at the announcements of seasoned
equity offerings for the focused decreased firms are low
negative/ positive,
zero.

a n d are not significantly different from

For the focus increased group of the sample,
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abnormal returns are negative and have statistically
significant t-statistics.

The phenomenon is also observed

for sample events from industrial as well as for
Utilities52.

The mean abnormal return difference between

the focus increased and focus decreased group is
significantly different for industrial samples.

[ Insert Table 20 about here ]

These results implies that if issuing firms have
increased their focus within the past two years by reducing
the numbers of segments within the organization,
issue equity,

and then

the market views that action more negatively.

When the issuing firms have reduced their number of segment
by selling some of the existing segments,

firms should have

excess cash in hand or debt capacity outstanding,

therefore,

if money is really needed, w h y is the cheapest means of
financing-debt is not used?

The market recognizes this, and

thus reacts more negatively to such announcements by
increased-focused firms.

Thus,

this paper finds support for

52 For the sample of Banks due to lake of any event in the
focus decreased group no conclusion could be drawn.
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the last hypothesis

(H7)

that focus increasing firms should

face more of a negative reaction at the announcement of
seasoned equity offerings.

b) Cross Sectional Regression Analysis

Results of the cross sectional regression is produced
in table 21.
events.

Panel-1 uses the overall sample of 550 sample

Results indicate that the coefficient of Herfindahl

index variable is consistently statistically insignificant,
but have positive sign. The coefficient for the dummy
variables for focus level

(HF/LF-D)

is found to be

statistically significant and has positive sign.

This

implies that market's reaction to seasoned equity offerings
has a positive association with issuing firms level of
diversification/ focus.
focused,

That is, if the firm is more

the less is the negative reaction,

H6 is supported.

hence hypothesis

The coefficients for the variable c a s h 

flow to total assets and market value of assets are
statistically significant and positive.

The signs and

significance levels of other variable used in the regression
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models is similar Co what have been observed throughout this
paper.

[ Insert Table 21 about here ]

The results of the total industrial samples are shown
in the panel 2 of table 21.

The results for the total

industrial sample are consistent with the findings of the
overall sample,
total assets

except for the coefficient for cashflow to

(CFTA), which is not significant any more but

have the same positive sign.
level

(HF/LF-D)

The coefficient for the focus

dummy remains consistently positive and

significant throughout the models.

This findings strongly

supports the validity of hypothesis H 6 .
sample is categorized by the focus level,

When the industrial
it is found that

the regression models in the high-focus level
no explanatory power,

(panel 4) have

and none of the independent variables

are statistically significant.

This could be attributed to

the fact that the sample size for this group is very small.
For the low-focused group

(panel 3) results are consistent

with the results of the total sample.
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In order to investigate further the market's
differential reaction to seasoned equity offering by the
issuing firms focus activities in the past, samples are
grouped into the categories of focus-increased and f ocusdecreased groups.

Samples those do not fall in any of this

categories are dropped.

The cross sectional regressions of

the sample groups are produced in table 22.
sample
dummy

For the total

(panel A)

it is observed that the coefficient for the

(INC/DCR-F)

to separate the sample between the focus-

increased group and the focus-decreased group is
consistently negative and statistically significant.

When

only the Industrial group is used in panel B, the results
are the same,

except that the level of significance drops as

3 -day cumulative abnormal returns are used.

This finding

supports the arguments developed in hypothesis H7 that
focus-increased firms' equity issuance is negatively viewed
by the market due to potential free cash flow problems
and/or management's inefficiency in the use of funds to
finance investment projects.

This argument is supported

when it is observed that the coefficient for cashflow to
total assets consistently shows a negative sign.

A stronger

conclusion in this aspect could not be drawn due to
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statistical insignificance of the estimated parameter for
the cash flow to total assets variable.

[ Insert Table 23 about here ]

c) Summary

The market's reaction to seasoned e quity offerings and
corporate diversification reveals that the market's reaction
to seasoned equity offerings has a significant positive
association with the issuing firms focus /diversification
level.

That is,

focused group,

if the issuing firm belongs to the high-

then the issue announcement has a less

negative impact.

The statistically significant difference

in abnormal returns exists between the two group in favor of
high-focused firms.

Thus,

the empirical findings here

clearly support hypothesis H 5 . The results of the regression
analysis further affirm the findings by showing a
significant coefficient for the focus level dummy.
When the results are examined by the focus activity of
the issuing firm,

it is found that the focus d ecreased firms
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market reactions to seasoned equity offerings is
insignificantly negative.

Whereas,

the firms which have

increased their focus in the past have negative significant
market reactions.

It is also observed that the mean

difference in abnormal returns between the focus increased
group and focus decreased group is statistically
significant.

This result supports the arguments of

hypothesis H7 developed in the Issues and Hypothesis section
of this paper.

The cross-sectional regression result also

show evidence supporting the empirical findings.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Until recently the empirical investigation of seasoned
equity announcements

implicitly assumed that all issuing

firms were unlevered firms.

This study addresses the issue

of market reaction to seasoned equity offering from the
perspective of a levered firm.

This study documents that

issuing firms existing leverage level has a significant
impact on the event-day abnormal return of the issuing firm.
It is also documented in this study that impacts of leverage
on the market reaction to seasoned equity offerings could be
positive

(growth impact of leverage)

or negative

(information asymmetry impact of leverage)
issue characteristics,
issue,

depending on the

such as, the exchange listing of the

the type of the issue, and multiplicity of the issue.

It is found that issues from industrial firms listed in
NASDAQ market system,

combined issues,

single issues support

the growth impact of leverage hypothesis

(H2).

Where as the

information asymmetry impact of leverage hypothesis

(HI) is

supported in the samples from AMEX and NYSE listed issues,
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in primary issues and in the issues by the multiple issuers.
These finding remain consistent w h e n other factors like the
growth opportunities of issuing firms is introduced in the
analysis.
Another important distinctive feature of this paper is
the relationship between Tobin's Q as a growth measure and
event-day and 3 -day cumulative abnormal returns is
consistently an d significantly negative.
supports the marginal growth argument
paper.

This result

(H3) developed in this

The average Tobin's Q ratio for the issuing firms is

very high,

indicating that the firms who make the decision

to issue equity are firms' with ample growth opportunities.
Therefore,

the marginal "good news"

impact from the seasoned

equity issue announcement is g reater for the low growth
firms than that for the high-growth firm.

Combining the

arguments of the leverage effect a n d the marginal growth
opportunity effect and the relationship between leverage and
growth opportunity the finding of this paper confirms the
theoretical argument that growth plays an important role in
determining the market reaction to seasoned equity offering,
but not in the w a y the previous works have argued for.
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It is important here to mention the distinctive feature
of this study compared to other studies:

first,

includes samples from the NASDAQ market;

second,

this study
this study

excluded sample events which have similar seasoned issue
events within a one year period around event date and other
similar events within one month of the event date to
eliminate any confounding effects.

The results indicate

that the NASDAQ listed firms loses more value than the firms
listed in NYSE.

This finding is opposite to what is

popularly thought that

NASDAQ firms should perform better,

as these firms are more rapidly growing firms and mostly
technology firms. But the results is consistent with the
argument of McLaughlin et al
(NASDAQ)

(1998),

that smaller firms

suffer more from information asymmetry problem than

the larger firms as more analysts follow larger firms.
The analysis of the impacts of corporate focus/
diversification on market's reaction to seasoned equity
offerings reveals that the market reaction is less negative
for the high-focused firm when compared with low-focused
diversified firms.

The argument is high-focused firms are

high value firms as well as having less information
asymmetry due to their lower level of diversity.
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issue announcements by this category of firm has less of a
negative impact when compared with diversified

(low-focused)

firms.
While examining the differential market reaction to
equity announcements by focus-increased firms and focus
decreased firms,

it is found that the market reacts

negatively to announcements by firms who have increased
their focus level in the recent p a s t .

The argument for

these focus-increased firms is that the financing need
should be met by the funds already acquired through the
focus increasing activity in the recent past.
these firms'

additional fund requirements increases the free

cash flow problem,
such announcements.
argument,

Therefore,

and thus should have negative reaction to
The findings are consistent with the

when it is observed that cashflow to total asset

has a negative coefficient in the regression result.
importantly,
(INC/DCR-F)

More

in the regression the dummy for focus activity
is consistently negative and significant.

It is also important here to note that low levered
firms issuing equity may signal under-utilization of
resources,

i.e.,

inefficiency of management,

but under

certain circumstance such a conclusion is not always true,
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specially,

in case of high technology based firms.

A great

number of growth opportunities for such firms lies in the
possession of technological advancements and/ or know-how.
These high technology based firms face a dilemma. They
cannot issue debt to finance new projects,

because that

would increase their overall distress situation.
other hand,

On the

they are high growth firms and they cannot

afford to pass the opportunity to invest in new projects.
Therefore,

it would be interesting to examine how market

reacts to these high technology based firms issue
announcements.
This paper consistently observes that the significance
level of event-day abnormal returns are much higher than
that of the 3 -day cumulative abnormal return,
returns are compared among the groups.

specially when

Therefore,

a further

study to investigate the market efficiency of seasoned
equity offerings wou l d be of great value.

Results not

reported in this study also reveal that the mean difference
between 5 -day cumulative abnormal return 10 days prior to
the event date and 5 -day cumulative abnormal return 10 days
after the event day are not statistically significant.
suggests that the negative reaction to season equity
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offerings may just be the effect of price pressure at the
announcement date, but such a conclusion needs further
investigation.
Finally,

the findings of this paper indicate that the

understanding of the market's reaction to seasoned equity
offerings is far from conclusive.

The results bring into

serious question the conclusions of the previous empirical
work.

%
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Figure 1
Figure showing the estimation Period, Event Window,
their relative position

Estimation Period
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and

Event Window

36

-15
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Table 1
The description of the data collection process from the Primary source half yearly publication from the Investment Dealers Digest, (a, b, c, d,
e, and refers to the selection criteria discussed in the data section of
methodology)

Primary1 Seasoned and Combined2 Seasoned Equity
offerings from the Primary source
LBSS(a ft b ) :
Sample firms NOT available in Compustat &
CRSP data tape for 1996.
LBSS (c ft d) :
Sample Events(Other seasoned equity issues)
within the past 12 months or subsequent 12
month period. Other issue(e.g., debt etc.,
within the days around event date.
LBSS(b) :
Sample Event does not have daily return data
data for -162 through +15 days of event date
AND, Sample Firms change in Accounting
Reporting date between 1983 and 1994.

Sisp]

tilabia for study

LBSS (•) :
Sample Firms NOT listed in New York Stock Exchange,
American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ Market System.
TOTAL Sample Bventa used in the Study

4876 svsnts

2012 events

915 events

559 events
1463 events

36 events
1353 events

TOTAL Sample Firms used in the Study

984 events

Sample events dropped as segment data not available
for more than seven years in the Compustat tape of 1996

803 events

Total Sample Bvent available for segment analysis

550 events.

Primary Seasoned offering refers to the pure seasoned equity offering
where no other issue is involved.
Combined Seasoned offering refers to primary and secondary seasoned
equity offering at the same date.
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Table 2
The distribution o f Sample Events' and Sample Firms2 by Exchange listing1 - New York Stock Exchange(NYSE), American Stock Exchange(AMEX), and
NASDAQ Market system(NSDQ); by Industry classification4 - Industrial (IND), Banks and Financial Institutions(BNK) and Utilities(UTL). and by the Event
year.

YEAR

SAMPLE EVENTS BY
EXCHANGE
NYSE

1
2
1
4

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

126
30

1993
1994

120
58

TOTA
L

807

61
73
56
22
43
35
94
89

SAMPLE FIRMS BY
EXCHANGE

NSDQ TOTA
AME
X
L
16
207
65
03
17
so
06
43
110
08
45
126
09
20
85
03
II
36
14
29
86
03
23
61
10
61
165
15
43
147
15
52
187
06
29
93
108

438

1353

NYSE

NSDQ

126
27
53
58
34
II
30
22
55
52
61
41

AME
X
16
03
05
06
06
02
10
03
04
07
09
05

570

76

338

65
15
37
37
16
08
25
14
42
29
32
18

SAMPLE E VENTS BY
INDU STRY

TOTA
L
207
45
95
101
56
21
65
39
101
88

IND

BNK

179
25

11
09

67
85
65
25
50
41
107
98

102
64

117
67

30
31
10
05
16
08
36
27
35
18

984

926

236

UTL

22
35
08

TOTA
L
207
50
110
126
85
36
86
61
165
147
187
93

191

1353

17
16
13
10
10
06
20
12
22

SAMPLE FIRMS BY
INDUSTRY
IND
BNK
UTL TOTAL
179
22
56
73
45
15
43
29
74
64
69
46

II
08
30
22
06
03
08
05
22
13
20
16

17
15
09
06
05
03
14
05
05

207
45
95
101
56
21
65
39
101

1)
13
02

88
102
64

715

164

105

984

Sample Events are the Seasoned Equity issue events between 1983 and 1994.
Sample Firms are the Seasoned Equity issuing firms.
Exchange listing is identified through the exchange listing code available in theCompustat Annual data tape.
Industry classification is done using the two-digit SIC code, available in the Compustat data Tape.
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Table 3
The distribution o f Sample Events by Exchange listing1 - New York Stock Exchange(NYSE), American Stock Exchange(AMEX), and NASDAQ Market
system(NSDQ); and by Industry classification - Industrial(IND), Banks and Financial Institutions(BNK) and Utilities(UTL). Samples are also distributed
by the Type o f issue - Primary (the seasoned equity issue where secondary issues were not involved on the same date), and Combined (the issues where
both primary and secondary took place at the same date), and by the multiplicity o f issue (If the firm made more than one issue within the sample period
then the issue is a multiple issue, else are Single issue events).

SINGLE
320
40
137

PRIMARY
MULTIPLE
328
32
113

TOTAL
648
72
250

SINGLE
103
24
129

COMBINED
MULTIPLE
56
12
59

TOTAL
159
36
188

SINGLE
423
64
266

TOTAL
MULTIPLE
384
44
172

TOTAL
807
108
438

497

473

970

256

127

383

753

600

1353

INDUSTRIAL
FINANCIAL
UTILITIES

340
112
45

249
90
134

589
202
179

232
17
07

105
17
05

337
34
12

572
129
52

354
107
139

926
236
191

TOTAL

497

473

970

256

127

383

753

600

1353

EXCHANGE
NYSE
AMEX •
NSDQ
TOTAL
INDUSTRIES

1 Exchange listing is identified through the exchange listing code available in the Compustat Annual data tape.
2 Industry classification is done using the first two-digit if Standard Industry Classification(SIC)code, available in the Compustat data Tape.

Table 4
Descriptive statistics for the Overall sample. Relative Primary and Combined
issues refers to issue size relative to Market value o f Assets. Adjusted(Adj.)
variable are the difference in the value of variable from it’s receptive
Industry (two-digit SIC) and Exchange median -value. For details of the
calculation process of the variables please refer to Appendix B.
Variable

N

Mean

Std Dev

Median

Minimum

Maximum

Issue Price
Relative Primary Issue
Relative Combined Issue

1353
970
383

24.0276
0.261
0.762

14.1349
0.3533
0.9942

2125
0.13
0.4877

1.375
0.00136
0.0137

10.5573

Leverage
Adj. Leverage

1344
1343

0.2667
0.0272

02187
0.1811

02319
0

0
-0.5203

1
0.9553

Tobins Q
Market-to-Book
1-Yr growth on ROS
3-Yr growth on ROS

1353
1353
1272
1276

1-2311
1.9208
-0.1625
-0.1646

1.3168
2.0311
13.9209
13.8993

0.8643
1.3472
0.0217
0.0217

-0.1737
1.0053
-340.9
-340.9

12.4019
27.8118
296.9
296.9

Adj. Tobin's Q
Adj. Market-to-Book
adj. 1-Yr growth on ROS
adj. 3-Yr growth on ROS

1353
1353
1272
1272

0.4823
0.1186
•0.1446
-0.1446

1.2052
1.2477
13.9205
13.9205

0.0629
-0.0021
0.0285
0.0285

-1.6617
-5.871
-341.1
-341.1

11.748
22.6087

Return on Sales(ROS)
Return on Assets
Cash-Flow to Total Assets
Market Value o f Assets

1313
1315
1315
1353

-0.078
0.1218
0.0551
1233.6

3.729
0.121
0.0955
4804.3

0.1361
0.1222
0.0541
166.3

-117.6
-0.661
-0.6624
2.708

0.883
0.9479
0.564
122639
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Table 5
Distribution o f segment sample events by the Type o f issue - Primary1 and Combined2 and by the multiplicity o f issue1 by the same firm. The distribution is
presented by the Exchange listing4 in panel A and by the Industry classification’ in panel B.
EXCHANGE

PRIMARY
MULTIPLE
147
II
43

TOTAL
268
23
91

SINGLE
49
12
42

COMBINED
MULTIPLE
27
07
31

171

201

382

103

INDUSTRIAL
BANKS

135
24

109
24

244
48

UTILITIES

22

68

TOTAL

192

190

SINGLE
121
12
48

NYSE
AMEX
NSDQ
TOTAL

76
19
73

SINGLE
170
24
90

TOTAL
MULTIPLE
174
18
74

TOTAL
344
42
164

65

168

305

245

550

92
08

54

146
19

227
32

163
35

390

II

90

03

0

3

25

68

93

382

113

55

168

305

245

550

TOTAL

'
INDUSTRIES

67

1 Primary Issue refers to the seasoned equity issue where secondary issues were not involved on the same date.
2 Combined Issues are those where primary and secondary seasoned equity issue took place at the same date.
3 Multiplicity o f issue refers to issue events by each sample firm. If the firm made more than one issue within (he sample period then the issue is a multiple
issue, else Single issue.
4 Exchange listing is identified through the exchange listing code available in the Compustat Annual data tape.
1 Industry classification is done using the first two-digit if Standard Industry Classification(SIC) code, available in the Compustat data Tape.
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Table 6
Descriptive statistics for the Segment sample. Relative Primary and Combined
issues refers to issue size relative to Market value o f Assets. Adjustment Adj.) refers to
the adjustment o f the variable relative to the industry and exchange. Adjusted variable
are the difference o f variable from it's respective Industry(two-digit SIC) and Exchange
median value. For details of the calculation process of the variables please refer to
Appendix B.

Variable

N

Std Dev

Mean

Median

MIN

MAX

Issue Price
Relative Primary Issue
Relative Combined Issue

550
382
168

24.0871
0.2726
0.7486

14.5164
0.3714
1.0872

21.5000
0.1326
0.5102

1.6250
0.0057
0.0401

146.0000
2.3354

Leverage
Adj. Leverage

550
549

0.2732
0.0247

0.2251
0.1785

0.2395
0.0000

0.0000
-0.5203

1.0000
0.6449

Tobins Q
Market-to-Book
1-Yr growth on ROS
3-Yr growth on ROS

550
550
522
523

1.3117
1.5029
0.7604
0.7591

1.1663
0.8817
13.4888
13.4759

0.9531
1.3269
0.0274
0.0275

-0.0340
1.0053
-15.5958
-15.5958

12.3180
12.4875
296.9000
296.9000

Adj. Tobin’s Q
Adj. Market-to-Book
adj. 1-Yr growth on ROS
adj. 3-Yr growth on ROS

550
550
522
522

0.4410
0.1019
0.7800
0.7800

0.7386
13.4830
13.4830

0.0884
0.0000
0.0348
0.0348

-1.6617
-2.1441
-15.5540
-15.5540

11.7480
9.1501
296.8000
296.8000

Return on Sales(ROS)
Return on Assets
Cash-Flow to Total Assets

528
529
529
550

-0.2657

0.1360
0.1205
0.0604

-117.6000
-0.6610
-0.6624

0.8830
0.9479
0.4127

221.9000

3.7920

122639.0000

Market Value o f Assets

0.1176
0.0520
1421.9000

1.0907

5.4627
0.1364
0.1158
6091.6000
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Table 7
Distribution of segment sample events by the Industry classification1and Exchange listing2 of the sample events. Panel A shows the distribution for the sample events by the Focus level - high-focus and low-focus; Panel B shows the
distribution by the focus activity over the last three years - Increased focus and decreased focus.

BANK

INDUSTRIES
INDUSTRY
UTILITIES

AMEX

EXCHANGES
NASDAQ
NYSE

TOTAL
INDUSTRY
EXCHANGE

PANEL - A
HIGH-FOCUSED
LOW-FOCUSED
TOTAL
PANEL - B

05
62
67

35
355
390

40
53
93

03
39
42

02
162
164

75
269
344

80
470
550

80
470
550

FOCUS-INCREASED

10
0
10

28
12
40

07
02
09

II
02
13

90
30
120

108

FOCUS-DECREASED
TOTAL

70
22
92

108
34
142

1
2

34
142

Exchange listing is identified through the exchange listing code available in the Compustat Annual data tape.
Industry classification is done using the first two-digit if Standard Industry Classiflcation(SIC) code, available in the Compustat data Tape.
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Table- 8
Event-day abnormal return, 3-days cumulative abnormal return, and S-days cumulative abnormal return
around the event date. Event date is the seasoned equity offering date. Sample are broken down by
Industry, Exchange listing.Type ofthe issue, and the multiplicity ofthe issuer. Numbers inthe Italicare
thet-statisticsfortheabnormal returns.Combined offeringsarewhere on the same eventdate both primary
and secondary seasoned equity isoffered. Multiple issuers arethose issue events issuersof which issued
more than one seasoned equity issue over the sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange identification of
the sample events Compustat assigned code isused. The same procedure is used to separate the sample
events between the Industries.
% OF POSITIVE
ON EVENT-DAY

CAR oq

CAR.,.,

C A R .,,

Total Sample (1333)

34.883%

•0.008416
(-11.8163)

-0.021626
(-1.93871)

-0.024328
(-1.7085)

Banks (236)

41.949%

Industrial (926)

33.153%

Utilities (191)

34.555%

-0.0061584
(-4.2232)
-0.0097866
(-9.6227)
-0.0045605
(-3.8706)

-0.0174887
(-7.0945)
-0.0249151
(-14.4787)
-0.017934
(-5.3319)

-0.020792
(-6.1614)
-0.027326
(-12.335)
-0.014165
(-5.2658)

American Stock Exchange (108)

29.630%

NASDAQ Market System (438)

34.932%

New York Stock Exchange (807)

35.564%

-0.0118388
(-4.2486)
-0.0096865
(-5.6966)
-0.0072684
(-9.1119)

-0.0258581
(-5.4790)
-0.026187
(-10.0125)
-0.0185847
(-12.3480)

-0.030098
(-5.0175)
-0.029278
(-8.5659)
-0.020870
(-10.747)

Multiple Issues (600)

36.167%

Single Issues (733)

33.864%

-0.0077751
(-7.6902)
-0.0089268
(-8.0736)

-0.0195346
(-10.9226)
-0.0232929
(-12.7017)

-0.022475
(-9.8468)
-0.025805
(-10.767)

Combined Issues (383)

33.420%

Primary Issues (970)

35.464%

-0.0114059
(-6.8148)
-0.0072355
(-8.7313)

-0.0272091
(-9.5281)
-0.0194219
(-13.8481)

-0.028946
(-7.8069)
-0.225050
(-12.380)
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Table • 9
Event-day abnormal returns, and 3-days cumulative abnormal return, and 5-days cumulative abnormal
return for the overall sample around the event date o f the high-levered firms and low levered firms grouped
by the industry classification, by the exchange listing o f the issue, types o f the issue and by the multiplicity
o f the issue. High-levered firms are those whose event year minus one leverage is greater than the industry
and exchange adjusted median leverage. Combined offerings are those where on the same event rfar«» both
primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers o f which
issued more than one seasoned equity issue over the sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange
identification o f the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to
separate the sample events between the Industries.
CARo.o
Total Sample

Low-Levered (687)
High-Levered (666)

Differences
Banks

Low-Levered (110)
High-Levered (126)

Industrial

Low-Levered (502)
High-Levered (424)

Utilities

Low-Levered (75)
High-Levered (116)

Differences

Differences

Differences
AMEX

Low-Levered (74)
High-Levered (34)

NASDAQ

Low-Levered (233)
High-Levered (205)

NYSE

Low-Levered (380)
High-Levered (427)

Differences

Differences

Differences
Combined

Low-Levered (230)
High-Levered (153)

Primary

Low-Levered (457)
High-Levered (513)

Differences

Differences
Multiple

Low-Levered (289)
High-Levered (311)

Single

Low-Levered (398)
High-Levered (355)

Differences

Differences

C A R -i.!

CAR-2.2

-0.00901994
-0.00779306

-0.02184419
-0.02140140

-0.02375360
-0.02492123

-0 00122688

-0.000442~9

0.00116~63

•0.00860890
-0.00401903

-0.01784080
-0.01718135

-0.02067191
-0.02089591

-0.00458987

-0.00065945

0.00022400

-0.00993390
•0.00961230

-0.02428773
-0.02565793

-0.02549117
-0.02949860

-0.0003216

0.0013702

0 00400743

-0.00350533
-0.00524280

-0.01136035
-0.01042687

-0.01664321
-0.01256249

0.00173747

-0.00093348

-0 00408072

-0.01014424
-0.01552703

-0.02377340
-0.03039536

-0.02790236
-0.03487643

0.00538279

0.00662196

0.0069'407

•0.01082192
-0.00839600

-0.02779233
-0.02436161

-0.02778555
-0.03097354

-0.00242592

-0.00343072

0.00318~99

-0.00769609
-0.00688777

-0.01782135
-0.01926407

-0.02047345
-0.02122287

-0.00080832

0.00144272

0.00074942

•0.01250668
-0.00975108

-0.02886600
-0.02471821

-0.03035049
-0.02683521

-0.00275560

-0.00414779

-0.00351528

-0.00726512
-0.00720910

-0.01831023
-0.02041217

-0.02043350
-0.02435039

-0.00005602

0.00210194

0.00391689

-0.00679392
•0.00868678

-0.01934845
-0.01970750

-0.02267766
-0.02228623

0.00189286

0.00035905

-0.00039143

-0.01063632
-0.00701012

-0.02365642
-0.02288535

-0.02453487
-0.02722964

-0.00362620

-0.00077/07

0.00269477

• (**) ( • • * ) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE 10
Event-day abnormal returns and 3-days cumulative abnormal returns for the seasoned equity issue events by the Industrial firms. Sample are split by the lowlevered firms and high levered firms with further broken down by the exchange listing, type o f issue and multiplicity o f the issue. High-levered firms are those
whose event year leverage is greater than the industry and exchange adjusted median leverage. Combined offerings are those where on the same event date both
primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers o f which issued more than one seasoned equity issue over the
sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange identification o f the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to separate the
sample events between the Industries
LOW-LEVERED
Event-day
3-days
Cumulative

♦

HIGH-L EVERED
Event-day
3-days
Cumulative

DIFFERENCES
Event-day
3-days
Cumulative

TOTAL SAMPLE 502/424
*

-0.00993390

-0.02428773

-0.00961230

-0.02565793

-0.0003216

4 0.0013702

AMEX 61/28
NASDAQ 199/155
NYSE 242/241

-0.01294373
-0.01016563
-0.00898467

-0.02601513
-0.02817043
-0.02065951

-0.01597460
-0.00889383
-0.00933520

-0.03760886
-0.02657569
-0.02367918

+0.003031
•0.001270
+0.000351

i 0.0115937
-0.0015947
+ 0.0030197

MULTIPLE ISSUER 187/168
SINGLE ISSUER 315/257

-0.00834376
-0.01087789

-0.02495967
-0.02388884

•0.01102412
-0.00869489

-0.02316805
-0.023727587

+0.002680
•0.002180

-0.0017916
-0.0001613

COMBINED ISSUES 200/137
PRIMARY ISSUES 302/287

-0.01289801
-0.00797091

-0.02947587
-0.02085188

-0.01179954
-0.00856822

-0.02729079
-0.02487848

-0.001100
+0.000597

-0.0021851
+ 0.0040266

AMEX - COMBINE ISSUES 21/10
NASDAQ-MULTIPLE 72/58
NYSE - MULTIPLE ISSUE 89/100
NYSE - SINGLE ISSUE 153/141
PRIMARY-MULTIPLE ISSUES 120/129

-0.02170565
-0.01388433
-0.00100277
-0.01362774
-0.00493202

-0.01823663
-0.03577530
-0.01487582
-0.02402388
-0.01795736

-0.00227404
-0.00786096
-0.01360803
-0.00630482
-0.01160626

-0.04411968
-0.01583633
-0.02593927
-0.02207628
-0.02431573

-0.019432*
-0.0199390
+0.012605***
-0.007323**
+.0.006674*

+0.0258831
-0.0199390**
+ 0.0110635
-0.0019476
+0.0063584

(♦ * •) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level

»•
M
-J

12 3
I able - tl

The descriptive statistics o f Tobin 's 0 variable used to differentiate between highgrowth firms and Iow-growth firms. 0 1*03 refers to the mean o f 2nd quartile and 3rd
quartiie o f the Tobin’s Q ratio. Samples are broken down by the type o f industry,
exchange listing, multiplicity o f the issue and by the type o f the issue.

MEAN

MEDIAN

Q1-Q3

Total Sample (1333)

1.229851

0.862519

0.880239

Banks (236)

1.125218

0.181806

0.954754

Industrial (926)

1.419943

0.995048

1.065508

Utilities (191)

0.900343

0.815083

0.160610

American Stock Exchange (108)

1.423621

1.039118

1.120032

NASDAQ Market System (438)

1.626855

1.137566

1.500464

New York Stock Exchange (807)

0.988445

0.796136

0.631616

Multiple Issues (600)

1.254251

1.609755

0.849879

Single Issues (733)

1.210509

1.385209

0.922627

Combined Issues (383)

1.612180

1.139653

1.181697

Primary Issues (970)

1.078890

0.799130

0.751509
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Table - 12

Event-day abnormal returns, and 3-days cumulative abnormal return, and 5-days cumulative abnormal
return for the overall sample around the event date by the low-Growth firms and high Growth firms with
further broken down by the exchange listing, type o f issue and multiplicity o f the issue. High-growth firms
are those whose event year Tobin’s Q is greater than one(I) and the Tobin’s Q is also greater than the
industry and exchange adjusted median Tobin’s Q. Combined offerings are where on the same event date
both primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers o f
which issued more than one seasoned equity issue over the sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange
identification o f the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to
separate the sample events between the Industries.
--------------

CARo.o

car . 2.2

CAR-1.1

Total Sample

Low-Growth (845)
High-Growth (508)
Differences

-0.00652826
-0.01155609
+0.005028***

-0.01958619
-0.02501959
+0.005433**

-0.02055383
-0.03060684
+0.010053***

Banks

Low-Growth ( 179)
High-Growth (57)
Differences
Low-Growth (501)
High-Growth (425)
Differences
Low-Growth (165)
High-Growth (26)
Differences

-0.00590927
-0.00694066
0.00103139
-0.00762368
-0.01233640
0.00471272**
•0.00387368
-0.00891952
0.00504584

-0.01689038
-0.01936770
0.00247732
-0.02365321
-0.02640270
0.00274949
-0.01016181
-0.01480175
0.00463994

-0.01800872
-0.02953041
0.01152169
-0.02412345
-0.03110148
0.00697803
-0.01247623
-0.02488120
0.01240497

Low-Growth (54)
High-Growth (54)
Differences
Low-Growth (218)
High-Growth (220)
Differences
Low-Growth (573)
High-Growth (234)
Differences

•0.00853828
-0.01513937
0.00660109
-0.00496036
-0.01436968
0.00940932***
-0.00693535
-0.00808394
0.00114859

-0.02321064
-0.02850555
0.00529491
-0.02018607
-0.03213263
0.01194656**
•0.01901640
-0.01752766
•0.00148874

•0.02131926
-0.03887655
0.01755729
-0.02048789
-0.03798750
0.01749961**
-0.02050678
-0.02175936
0.00125258

Low-Growth (180)
High-Growth (203)
Differences
Low-Growth (665)
High-Growth (305)
Differences

-0.00580250
-0.01637438
0.01057188***
-0.00672471
-0.00834917
0.00162446

-0.02079369
-0.03289755
0.01210386**
-0.01925935
-0.01977622
0.00051687

-0.01786809
-0.03876917
0.02090108***
•0.02T28080
-0.02517420
0.0038934

Low-Growth (370)
High-Growth (230)
Differences
Low-Growth (475)
High-Growth (278V
Differences

•0.00662853
•0.00961945
0.00299092
-0.00645015
-0.01315836
0.00670821

-0.01828522
-0.02154435
0.00325913
-0.02059958
-0.02789478
0.0072952

-0.01886964
-0.02827431
0.00940467*
-0.02186572
•0.03253663
0.01067091**

Industrial

Utilities

AMEX

NASDAQ

NYSE

Combined

Primary

Multiple

Single

* (**) (***) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level
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TABLE - 13
Event day abnormal returns and 3-days cumulative abnormal returns for the seasoned equity issue events by the Industrial firms. Sample are split by the lowGrowth Firms and high Growth firms with further broken down by the exchange listing, type o f issue and multiplicity o f the issue. High-growth firms are those
whose event year Tobin’s Q is greater than on e(l) and the Tobin’s Q is also greater than the industry and exchange adjusted median Tobin's Q. High-levered
firms are those whose event year leverage is greater than the industry and exchange adjusted median leverage. Combined offerings are those where on the same
event date both primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers o f which issued more than one seasoned equity
issue over the sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange identification o f the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to
separate the sample events between the Industries.
LOW-G M3WTH
3-days
Event-day
Cumulative

HIGH-G ROWTH
Event-day
3-days
Cumulative

DIFFERENCES
Event-day
3-days
Cumulative

•
TOTAL SAMPLE 501/425

-0.00762368

•0.01958619

-0.01233640

-0.02501939

+0.00471272**

+0.005433**

AMEX 44/45
NASDAQ 141/213
NYSE 316/167

-0.00795398
-0.00327758
-0.00951693

-0.02447581
-0.0220S46I
-0.02425197

-0.01970846
-0.01379984
-0.00848338

-0.03473412
-0.03105844
-0.01821954

+0 01175448*
+0 01052226***
•0.00103355

+00102583
+0.0090038
•00060324

MULTIPLE ISSUER 176/178
SINGLE ISSUER 325/247

•0.00831212
-0.00714255

-0.02395633
-002348905

•0.01069202
•0.01352142

-0.02427084
-0.02793902

+0.00217990
+0.00637887**

+0.0003145
+00044500

COMBINED ISSUES I32/I8S
PRIMARY ISSUES 349/240

-0.00721672
-0.00780092

-0.02249224
-002415885

-0.01675243
•0.00893238

-0.03359564
-0.02085814

+0.00953571***
+0.00113146

+0.0111034*
-00033007

AMEX - COMBINED ISSUES 21/10
AMEX-MULTIPLE ISSUES
NASDAQ-COMBINED 68/106
NASDAQ - MULTIPLE 43/87
NASDAQ - SINGLE 98/126
NYSE-PRIMARY 247/104
NYSE - MULTIPLE 122/67
COMBINED - MULTIPLE 41/64
COMBINED - SINGLE 111/121

-0.00277684
+0.00200050
-0.00557633
•0.00438548
-0.00279146
-0.00943826
-0.01091445
-0.00655963
-0.00745943

-0.02338303
-0.02329038
-0.02555193
-001712870
-0.02421398
-000703262
•0 02642284
-002342432
-0.02214796

-0.02730665
-0.02156923
•0.01865056
-0.01456359
-0.01327248
-0.02563999
-0.00176845
•0.01630184
-0.01699075

-0.04785038
-0.03617190
-0.03489720
-0.03169879
•0.03061629
-0 01242480
-0.01036252
-0.03569552
•0.03248496

+0.02452981*
*0.02356973**
+0.01307423**
+0.01017811*
+0.01048102**
+0.0162017
-0.00914600**
♦0.00974221*
+000953132**

+0 0244674
+0 0128815
+0.0093453
+0.0145701
+00064003
+00053922**
-0 0160603
+00122712
♦0 0103370

* (* * )(* * * ) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.03) (0 .0 1) level

130

Table 14

Event day abnormal returns o f the Overall sample events broken down by the leverage level and growth
level. Numbers in the parenthesis are the number o f sample events. High-growth firms are those whose
event year Tobin’s Q is greater than on e(l) and the Tobin’s Q is also greater than the industry and
exchange adjusted median Tobin’s Q. High-levered firms are those whose event year leverage is greater
than the industry and exchange adjusted median leverage. Combined offerings are where on the same event
date both primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers
o f which issued more than one seasoned equity issue over the sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange
identification o f the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to
separate the sample between the Industries.

TOTAL SAMPLE

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES
BANKS

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

INDUSTRIALS

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

UTILITIES

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES

DIFFERENCES

DIFFERENCES
AMEX

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

NASDAQ

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

NYSE

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

LOW-LEVERED

HIGH-LEVERED

DIFFERENCES

-0.00738888 (315)
-0.01040108 (372)

-0.00601676 (530)
-0.01471541 (136)

-0.0013~212
0 00431433

0.0030122

0 00869865“ *

-0.00824357 (76)
-0.00942552 (34)

-0.00418687(102)
-0.00326740 (23)

0.00118195

-0.00091947

-0.00884247(186)
-0.01057633 (316)

-0.00690401 (315)
-0.01743901 (109)

0.00173386

0.010535*“

•0.00106201 (53)
-0.00939150(22)

-0.00520420(112)
-0.00632360 (04)

0.00832949

0.0011194

-0.00449467 (30)
-0.01399622(44)

-0.01359279 (24)
-0.02016923(10)

DIFFERENCES 0.00950155“
-0.00731447(75)
-0.01248685(158)

DIFFERENCES 0.00517238
-0.00782891 (210)
-0.00753203 (170)

DIFFERENCES ■0.00029688
COMBINED

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

PRIMARY

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES

DIFFERENCES
MULTIPLE

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

SINGLE

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES

DIFFERENCES

-0.00859026 (73)
-0.01432769 (157)

-0.004056~
-0.00615812
-0.00193846
000686268*
0.00414219*
-0.0030679

0.00909812
0.00617301

0.00657644
-0.00372569(143)
-0.01916786 (62)

-0 003588"8
0.00668101

0.01544217•**
-0.00641841 (363)
-0.00954995 (64)

-0 0014105
0 0020 r 92

0.00313154
-0.00390057(107)
-0.02335980 (46)

0.00573743

0.01945923*“

-0.00702648 (242)
-0.00753373 (215)

-0.00655206 (423)
-0.01029717(90)

0.00050725

0.00374511

-0.00466210(127)
-0.00846516 (162)

-0.00765626 (243)
•0.01236936 (68)

0.00380306

0.0047131

-0.00923090(188)
-0.01189449(210)

•0.00462861 (287)
-0.01706147(68)

0.00266359

0.01243286“

-0.00468969
0.00903211
-0.00047442
000276344

0.00299416
0 0039042
-0.00460229
0.00516698

* (**) (***) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level
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Table— 15

3-Day cumulative abnormal returns o f the Overall sample events broken down by the leverage level and
growth level. Numbers in the parenthesis are the number o f sample events. High-growth firms are those
whose event year Tobin’s Q is greater than o n e(I) and the Tobin’s Q is also greater than the industry and
exchange adjusted median Tobin’s Q. High-levered firms are those w hose event year leverage is greater
than the industry and exchange adjusted median leverage. Combined offerings are where on the same event
date both primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers
o f whic- ssued more than one seasoned equity issue over the sam ple period (1983-1994). For Exchange
identifkuiion o f the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to
separate the sample between the Industries.
LOW-LEVERED
TOTAL SAMPLE

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES
BANKS

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

INDUSTRIALS

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

UTILITIES

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES
DIFFERENCES
DIFFERENCES
AMEX

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

NASDAQ

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

NYSE

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES
DIFFERENCES
DIFFERENCES
COMBINED

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

PRIMARY

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES
DIFFERENCES
MULTIPLE

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

SINGLE

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES.
DIFFERENCES

HIGH-LEVERED

-0.01848642
-0.02468745

-0.02023983
-0.02592807

0.00620103'

0.00568824

-0.01732883
-0.02814468

-0.01654318
-0.02003922

0.01081585

0.00349604

-0.02170288
-0.02580919
-0.00881237
-0.01749868

-0.02480483
-0.02812331
0.00331848
-0.01080038
0.00003137

0.00868631

-0.01083175"

-0.01666242
-0.0286218

-0.03139593
•0.02799404

0.00410631

0.01195938

-0.00340189

-0.0192469
-0.03184871

-0.02067865
-0.03285617

0.01260181

0.01217752

-0.0184754
-0.0170134

-0.01932938
-0.01889367

-0.001462

-0.00043571

-0.02115407
-0.0324518

-0.02054782
-0.03441891

0.01129773

0.01387109

-0.01768172
-0.01901767

-0.02016193
-0.02158831

0.00133595

0.00142638

-0.01512005
-0.0226633

-0.01993945
-0.01887861

0.00175341
0.00124062
-0.00078565
-0.00810546
0.00310195
0.00231412
0.00198801
-0.01753005'
0.01473351
•0.00062776
0.00143175
0.00100746
0.00085398
0.00188027
•0.00060625
0.00196711
0.00248021
0.00257064
0.0048194
-0.00378469

-0.00106084

0.00754325

-0.02049417
' -0.03297753

-0.02076051
-0.02624894

0.00548843

DIFFERENCES

I

0.01248336

* (**) (***) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level
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-0.00026634
0.00672859
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TaMc — 16
Event day abnormal returns o f the Industrial sample events broken down by the leverage level and growth
level. Numbers in the parenthesis are the number o f sample events. High-growth firms are those whose
event year Tobin's Q is greater than o n e (l) and the Tobin’s Q is also greater than the industry and
exchange adjusted median Tobin’s Q. High-levered firms are those whose event year leverage is greater
than the industry and exchange adjusted median leverage. Combined offerings are where on the same event
date both primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers
o f which issued more than one seasoned equity issue over th* sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange
identification o f the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to
separate the sample between the Industries.

TOTAL SAMPLE

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES
AMEX

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES
NASDAQ

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES
NYSE

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES
COMBINED

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES
PRIMARY

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES
MULTIPLE

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES
SINGLE

LOW-GROWTH
HIGH-GROWTH

DIFFERENCES

LOW-LEVERED

HIGH-LEVERED

DIFFERENCES

-0.00884247(186)
-0.01057633 (316)
0 001-3386

-0.00690401 (315)
-0.01743901 (109)
0.010535***

-0.00193846
0.00686268*

-0.00411023 (23)
-0.01829031 (38)

-0.0121638 (21)
-0.02740699 (07)

0.0I4I8008***

0.01524319

-0.00536496 (47)
-0 .01164004(152)

-0.00223389 (94)
-0.01915669(61)

0.00627508

0.0169228***

-0.01118975(116)
-0.00695461 (126)

-0.00854669 (200)
-0.1318157(41)

-0.00423514

0.12326901

-0.00909656 (59)
-0 .01448869(141)

-0.00602413 (93)
-0.02400666 (44)

0.00539213

0.01798253***

-0.00872442 (127)
-0.00742408 (175)

-0.00727261 (222)
-0.01299321 (65)

-0.00130034

0.0057206

-0.00749329 (58)
-0.00 8 7 2 6 1 5 (1 2 9 )

-0.0090129(118)
-0.01586748 (49)

0.00123286

0.00685458

-0.00945381 (128)
-0 .0 1185266(187)

-0.00564082 (197)
-0.01872242 (60)

0.00239885

0.0130816**

* (**) (***) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level
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0.00805357
0.009U668

-0.00313107
0.00751665

-0.00264306
0.12486109

-0.00307243
0.00951797

-0.00145181
0.00556913

0.00151961
0.00714133

-0.00381299
0.00686976
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Table - 17
Regression results of cross-sectional regression analysis of Overall sample (Panel A), and Industrial sample (Panel B). The dependent variables is the Evcnl-days abnormal return.
Independent variables are: Leverage ratio (LEVRG), Tobin’s Q ratiof T-Q), Size o f the seasoned equity Issue adjusted by the Market value of assets (ISUSIZE), Cashflow to total
Assets (CFTA), Log of Market value o f Assets (L(MVA)), Dummy for the Type o f the Issue (TYPE) if the issue is a combined issue then TYPE takes value I, zero otherwise,
and another dummy for the Multiplicity o f the lssuc(MLTPL) where, if the issue is by a multiple issuer then Ml.TPL lakes value I else takes the value zero. Dummy XNGI lakes
value l(one) is the issue is listed in NASDAQ, 0(zcro) otherwise, and dummy XNG2 takes value l(one) is the issue is listed in NYSE else take value 0(zcro).
INTRCPT

T-Q

•0.00578***
-0.00990***
-0.005SD***
-0.00357**
-0.00)69*
-0.00679*
•0.00644*
-0.00913**

-0.00220* ••

-0.00644***
-0 00963***
-0.00302
•0.00137
-0.00151
-0 00416
•000304
•000738

-0.00233***

LEVRG

ISUSIZE

CFTA

MMVA)

TYPE

MLTPL

XNGI

XNG2

ADJ R-SQ

PROB>F

000224

00100
00009
0.0093
00248
0 0241
0 024)
00230
00227

00002
01409
00008
00001
00001
00001
00001
00001

+0002798

00103
-0.0011
0.0132
00200
00189
00184
00176
00186

0001)
08845
00008
00001
00002
oooos
00015
00019

Paacl-A
MODEL -1
MODEL -2
MODEL-3
MODEL -4
MODEL-S
MODEL-6
MODEL -7
MODEL-8

•0.00226***
-0.00099
•0.00098
•0.00094
-0.00096
-0.00096

+0.00325
•0 00079
-0.00427
•0.00415
•0 00S67
-000568
•0.00533

-0.00001***
•0.00001***
-000001***
-0.00001***
-0.0000 !•*♦

+0.00144
+0.00262
+0.00380
+0 00340

+0.00059
+0.00052
+0.00036

-0 00095
•0 00104

+0 00034
+000033

+0 00368

Paacl-B
MODEL-I
MODEL -2
MODEL-3
MODEL -4
MODEL -S
MODEL -6
MODEL -7
MODEL -8

-0.00305***
-0.00211**
-0 00209*•
•0.00214**
-0.00218**
-0.00224**

-0.00070
-0.01036*
-0.01265**
-O.OI252**
-0.01421**
-001394**
-001304**

-000001***
-0 00001***
-0 00001••
•000001*
•0 00001*

+0.00140
+000162
+000422
+000374

+000057
+000042
+0.00059

-000250
-0 00275

+000022
+000019

+0.00580

* (* * )(* * * ) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level
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Table - 18

Event-day abnormal return, 3-days cumulative abnormal return, and S-days cumulative abnormal return
around the event date. Event date is the seasoned equity offering date. Sample are broken down by
Industry, Level o f Focus using measure o f Herfindahl Index, and by the characteristics whether the firm
has increased or decreased focus in the past two years. Exchange listing. Numbers in the Italic are the tstatistics for the abnormal returns. Combined offerings are where on the same event date both primary and
secondary seasoned equity is offered. For Industry identification o f the sample events Compustat assigned
code is used.
% OF
POSITIVE
ON EVENTDAY
Total Sample (5S0)

Banks (67)
Industrial (390)
Utilities (93)

Low-Focused firms (470)
High-focused firms (80)

Focus-Decreased firms (34)
Focus-Increased firms (108)

33.818%

38.806%
34.103%
29.032%

34.043%
32.500%

41.176%
33.333%

CUMULATIVE CUM ULATIVE CUMULATIVE
ABNORM AL
ABNORMAL
ABNORMAL
RETURN
RETURN
RETURN
(CAR*,,)
(CAR_2j)
(CARo.o)
-0.0077593

-0.0222482

-0.0253050

(-6.2234969)

(-10.3524879)

(-8.8348033)

-0.0061204

-0.0223947

-0.0281230

(-3.3220608)

(-5.2758592)

(-4 1881187)

•0.0081631

•0.0243086

-0.0259596

(-4.8714528)

(-8.5253349)

(-6.9256363)

-0.0072465

-0.0135021

-0.0204041

(-3.9996239)

(-4.6325057)

(-5.0737493)

-0.0081452

-0.0241938

-0.0270284

(-5.8453073)

(-10.2757292)

(-8.6946852)

-0.0054922

-0.0108177

-0.0151799

(-2.1597445)

(-2.1474938)

(-2.0774432)

+0.00032344

-0.0095545

-0.0040735

(+0.1046223)

(-1.0687636)

(-0.3441721)

-0.0076122

-0.0247227

-0.0289556

(-3.0157780)

(-5.1248885)

(-48314578)

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

135

Table 19

Event-day abnormal return. 3-days cumulative abnormal return, and 5-days cumulative abnormal
return around the event date o f seasoned equity offering by the segment sample. Differences in
abnormal returns were also presented. Level o f Focus using measure o f Herfindahl Index.
Numbers in the Italic are the t-statistics for the abnormal returns. Combined offerings are where
on the same event date both primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. For Industry
identification o f the sample events Compustat assigned code is used.

TOTAL SAMPLE - 5 5 0
EVENT-DAY
3-DAYS CUMULATIVE
5-DAYS CUMULATIVE

BANKS - 67
EVENT-DAY
3-DAYS CUMULATIVE
5-DAYS CUMULATIVE

INDUSTRIAL - 390
EVENT-DAY
3-DAYS CUMULATIVE
5-DAYS CUMULATIVE

UTILITIES - 93
EVENT-DAY
3-DAYS CUMULATIVE
5-DAYS CUM ULATIVE

LOWFOCUSED

HIGHFOCUSED

N-470

N=80

•0.00814518

-0.00549223

(-5.8453073)

(-2.1597445)

-0.02419376

-0.01081770

(-10.2757292)

(-2.1474938)

-0.02702838

-0.01517993

(-8.6946852)

(-2.0774432)

N=62

N=5

-0.0055017

-0.0137915

(-2.9561326)

(-1.5461641)

•0.0207868

-0.0423336

(-4.796406J)

(-2.3496704)

-0.0255542

-0.0599764

(-3.9655130)

(-1.3971655)

N=355

N=35

-0.0085817

-0.0039178

(-4.8317884)

(-0.7952301)

-0.0261509

-0.0056223

(-8.8371783)

(-0.5609965)

-0.0279010

-0.0066014

(-7.1976959)

(-0.1711382)

N=53

N=40

-0.0083137

-0.0058324

(-3.2544202)

-2.3082376

-0.0150704

-0.0114242

(-3.7735925)

-2.6762825

-0.0229079

-0.0170865

(-4.1643687)

-2.8987375

DIFFERENCES

-0.002653
-0.013376 • •
-0.011848

+ 0.008290

+0.021547
+0.034422

-0.004664
-0.020529• •
- 0.021300

-0.002481
-0.003646
-0.005821

• (* •) (•« * ) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level
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Table 20

Event-day abnormal return, 3-days cumulative abnormal return, and 5-days cumulative abnormal
return around the event date o f seasoned equity offering by the segment sam ple. Differences in
abnormal returns between the focus-increased firms and focus decreased firms. Numbers in the
Italic are the t-statistics for the abnormal returns. Combined offerings are w here on the same event
date both primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. For Industry identification o f the
sample events Compustat assigned code is used.
DECREASED
-FOCUS
N=34
+0.00032344
(+0.1046223)
-0.00955451
(-1.06876223)
-0.00407351
(-0.3441721)

INCRESEDFOCUS
N =I08
-0.00761222
(-3.0157780)
-0.02472270
(-5.1248885)
-0.02895564
(-4.8314578)

N=0

N=10

EVENT-DAY

-

3-D A Y S CUMULATIVE

-

5-D A Y S CUMULATIVE

-

-0.0025881
(-0.6173238)
-0.0314057
(-1.6549402)
-0.0292935
(-1.4221605)

TOTAL SAMPLE - 142
EVENT-DAY
3-DAYS CUMULATIVE
5-DAYS CUMULATIVE

BANKS - 10

INDUSTRIAL - 92
EVENT-DAY
3-D A Y S CUMULATIVE
5-D A Y S CUMULATIVE

UTILITIES - 40
EVENT-DAY
3-D A Y S CUMULATIVE
5-D A Y S CUMULATIVE

DIFFERENCES

+0.007936*
+0.015168
+0.024882**

N=70

Af=22
+0.00226902
(+0.5201564)
-0.01057471
(-0.7705367)
-0.00310860
(-0.1803045)

-0.00913461
(-2.4695517)
-0.02838435
(-4.2042842)
-0.03158900
(-3.6773759)

V = /2
-0.00324346
(-0.9047715)
-0.00768413
(-1.7346361)
-0.00584251
(-0.4771906)

-0.00560059
(-2.0891593)
-0.01318178
(-3.4174632)
-0.02225156
(-4.4701742)

+0.011404*
+0.017810
+0.028480

N=28
+0.002357
+0.005498
+0.016409

* (**) (***) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level
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T able-21
Cross-sectional regression results of the samples used in this section of study Dependent variable is 3-DAYS COMULATIVE abnormal return. Independent variables arc;
Herfindahl Indcx(HI), Leverage ratio(LEV), Tobin’s Q ratio. Market to Book ratio(M/B), Cashflow to total Assets(CFTA), Log of Market value of Assets (L(MVA)), Size of the
seasoned equity Issue adjusted by the Market value of assets (ISUSIZE). Dummy HF takes value l(one) if the issuing firms is a high-focused firm and 0 (zero) otherwise, the
dummy INC-F takes value I(one) if the firm has increased focus in the past three years, 0 (zero) otherwise.
INTCPT
Panel-1
Overall Sample (550)
MODEL -1
MODEL -2
MODEL -3
MODEL-4
MODEL -5
Panel-2
Industrial-TOTAL
MODEL -1
MODEL -2
MODEL -3
MODEL -4
MODEL -5
Panel-3
Industrial-Low Focused
MODEL -1
MODEL -2
MODEL -3
MODEL-4
MODEL -5
Panel-4
Industrial-High Focused
MODEL -1
MODEL -2
MODEL -3
MODEL -4
MODEL -5

HF/LF-D

HI

LEV

TOBINS Q

•0.017649*
-0.009902
•0.009704
-0.012607
-0.039082**

+0.014386**
+0.015503**
+O.OI3882**
+0.014010**
+0.010874*

-0.007877
-0.008421
-0.005423
-0.006831
+0.001398

•0.013642
47.018798
47.014975
-0.025446**

0.002859
0.000880
0.000353
0.000333

-0.019553
•0.007059
-0.006727
-0.009641
-0.048047**

+0.020868**
+0.022341**
+0.021414**
+0.021123**
+0.018115*

-0.007453
-0.009074
-0.007299
-0.008686
+0.002094

-0.024598
-0.027768*
0.024664
0.041994**

0.003915
O.OQ27IO
0.001780
0.002533

ISUSIZE

0.000000
0.000000**
0.000000

0.000000
0.000000
+0.000000

CFTA

+0.034801*
+0.035469*

+0.031682
+0.028076

UMVA)

ADJ R-SQ

PROB>F

+0.003843**

0.0064
0.0069
0.0167
0.0205
0.0279

0.0682
0.1061
0.0163
0.0096
0.0027

+0.005957**

0.0065
0.0101
0.0101
0.0123
00260

0 1044
0 0951
0.1134
0.0965
0.0167

1
•0.021860*
•0.009061
-0.008702
•0.011557
-0.060832***

•0.004836
-0.006868
-0.004937
•0.006308
+0.007114

0.026081*
0.029647*
0.026773
0.049684***

0.003645
0.002304
0.001325
0.002275

+0.096681
+0.122617
+0.122818
+0.103106
+0.178884

-0.109915
-0.113986
-0.115479
-0.119489
•0.151455

0.031010
0.029227
+0.000282
+0.000661

0.010054
0.010437
0.017535
0.013494

0.000000
0.000000
0.000000

+0000000
0.000000
0.000000

+0.030396
+0.024938

+0354623
+0 330749

+0.007766***

47.0025
0.0009
00014
0.0034
0.02467

0.7216
0.3444
0.3438
0.2900
0.0172

47.006624

0.0149
47.0239
-0.0579
470053
470154

0.2273
0.5391
0 71II
04560
04993

* (**) (***) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level
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Table - 22

CrosssectionalregressionresultsfortheIndustrialsample which have eitherincreasedfocusordecreased focusinthepastthreeyears. Dependent variableis
theEVENT-DAY’S abnormal return. Independent variablesare: Leverage ratio(LEV),Tobin’sQ ratio,Cashflow tototalAssets(CFTA), Relativeissue
size(sizeoftheissueadjustedby themarket valueofassets). Variable HF/LF-D referstoDummy which lakesvalue I(one)iftheArms isahigh-focused
firmsattheissueannouncement yearand0 (zero)otherwise. Dummy variableINC/DCR-F takesvalue I(one)ifthefirmbelongs tofocusincreasegroupand
0(zero)otherwise.
INTCPT
Total Sample (142)
MODEL-1
MODEL -2
MODEL-3
MODEL -4
MODE). -5
Panel-1
Total Industrial (92)
MODEL-1
MODEL -2
MODEL -3
MODEL -4
MODEL -5
Panel-2
Incrcased-Focused (70)
MODEL-1
MODEL -2
MODEL -3
MODEL -4
Panel-3
Dccreascd-Focus (22)
MODEL-I
MODEL -2
MODEL -3
MODEL -4

HI

-0.002926
-0.001786
+0.008759
+0.011178
+0.016828

+0.005920
+0.003519
+0.002610
+0.008006
+0.005431

-0.001645
+0.000011
+0.012858
+0.015763
+0.021331

+0.007576
+0.003837
+0.002027
+0.010600
+0.007117

-0.016021
•0.001913
-0.000610
+0.010207

+0.009473
+0.005208
+0.016169
+0.010458

INC/DCR-F
-0.008573*
•0.008613*
-0.009110*
-0.008807*
-0.008546*

-O.OI2557*
-0.012667*
-0.013362*
-0.013629*
-0.012671*

IIF/LF-D

+0.003028
+0.004997
+0.001990
+0.003022

LEV

-0.025515**
-0.037151***
-0.040510***

TOBIN’S Q

-0.000375
+0.003536
+0.001446

+0.006076
+0.011013
+0.007204
+0.007816

-0.036140**
-0.050154***
-0.053153***

+0 000152
+0.004780
+0.002544

+0.003493
+0.010167
+0.004704
+0.006199

•0.036625
-0.050719**
-0.056607* *♦

-0.000248
+0.005426
+0.001630

+0.028237
+0.022106
+0.022220
+0.023593

-0 024776
•0.025414
-0.025421

+0.005480
+0.005542
+0.002883

ISUSIZE

-0.000000**
-0.000000**

-0.000000**
-0.000000**

-0.000000**
-0.000000* ♦

CFTA

•0.038430

ADJ R-SQ
0.0071
0.0013
0.0290
0.0650
0.0687

PROB>F
02253
0.3674
0.1087
0.0190
0.0198

-0.033549

0.0097
. 0.0027
0.0523
0.0983
0.0956

0 2412
0.3610
0.0861
0.0208
0.0290

-0.049532

•0.0200
00088
0.0705
0.0738

07246
03394
0.0838
0.0918

+0.184135

0.0499
0.0495
•0.0098
0.0816

02376
03190
0 4711
03113

•
+0.030094
+0.025627
+0.026098
+0.018439

-0.056342
-0.039775
-0.039842
-0.027300

L3 9

*(**)(***)denotessignificantatthe0.10(0.05)(0.01)level

•0.000000
-0.000000

Appendix A

Distribution of Sample events by two-digit SIC code representing Industry
Classifications assigned by Compustat broken down by Total
Sample( 1353 sample events) and Segment Sample(550 sample events)
Twodigit
SICs

Industry

Total
Event

01
10
12
13
15
16
17
20
22
23
24

Agric Prod-Crops
Metal Mining
Coal Mining
Oil and Gas Extraction
Bldg Constr-Gen. Op Bldr
Constraction- Heavy
Constraction-Spcl Trade
Food & Kindred Products
Textile Mill Product
Appareal & Other Fnsh Prod.
Lumber & Wood Pds

3
16
1
51
12
3
I
15
15
8
8

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
44
45

Furniture & Fixtrue
Paper & Allied Products
Printing. Publishing & Allied
Chemical & Allied Products
Pete Refining & Related Ind.
Rubber & Misc. Plastic Prod.
Leather & Leather Product
Stone. Clay. Glass. Concrete
Primary Metal Industries
Fabr Metal. Ex Machy. Trans
Indl.Comml.Machy.Computer
Electr.Oth Elec Eq. Ex Cmp
Transportation Equipmets
Meas Instr.PhotoGds;Watch
Misc Manufacturing Ind
Railroad Transportation
Transit & Passenger Trans
Motor Freight Trans.Wrhous
Water Transportation
Transportation by Air

4
12
13
66
8
12
4
9
31
12
110
90
30
61
8
1
2
9
3
25

Seg
ment
Event
1
4
-

26
7
I
1
6
6
6
4
2
3
5
32
6
6
I
3
11
5
47
41
15
19
2
-

2
3
1
7

Two
digit
SICs
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
67
70
72
73
75
76
78
79
80
83
87
99

Industry

Transportation Services
Communications
Electric. Gas. Senetary Srvcs
Durable Goods-Wholesales
Nondurable Goods-Wholesale
Bldg matLHrdwr.Garden-Retl
Gen Marchandise Stores
Food Stores
Auto Dealers. Gas Stations
Apparel & Accessory Stores
Home Furniture & Equip
Store
Eating & Drinking Places
Miscellaneous Retails
Depository Institutions
Nondepository Credit Instn
Security & Commodity Broker
Insurance Carriers
Ins Agents.Brokerage & Srvcs
Real Estate
Holding.other Invest Offices
Hotels. Other Loding Places
Personal Services
Business Services
Auto Repairs. Srvcs. Parking
Misc Repair Services
Motion Pictures
Amusements. Recreations
Health Services
Social Services
Engr.Acc.Resh.Mgnt.Rel Svcs
Nonclassified Establishmedts
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Total
Event

I
23
191
23
16
7
11
8
2
9
11
24
18
106
13
9
54
2
I
51
2
2
58
2
1
5
3
34
1
15
1

Seg
ment
Event
-

11
93
10
5
I
4
4
1
5
7
9
12
-

10
2
22
1
-

32
1
-

16
1
-

1
3
17
-

9
-

APPENDIX B
The variable used in the study are calcualted as below using compustat data Item. Please
refer toAppendix C for detail understanding of the variable names(DI standsfor
Compustat data Item).
Return on Sales, ROS = DI13/DI12.
Return on Assets, ROA = DI13/DI6.
Market Value of Assets, MVA = SUM(DI9, DI10, DI34, DI235).
Return on Market Value of Assets, ROV = DI13/MVA.
Cash Flow to Total Assets. CFTA = (DI13-SUM(DI15, DI16,
DI19, DI21))/DI6.
Research & Development Expenses to Sales, RD = DI46/DI12.
Advetising Expenses to Sales, AD = DI45/DI12.
Book Value to Market Value Ratio, BM = DI6/MVA.
Intangible to Total Assets, IA = DI33/DI6.
Net Investment to Total Assets, NTTA = (SUM(DI113, DI128.DI129)
-SUM(DI107, DI109))/DI6.
Market Value of Capital Stock, MVCS = DI25*DI199.
Market Value of Equity, MVE = SUM(DI235, DI10).
Total Debt, DEBT = SUM(DI9, DI44).
Book Leverage Ratio, BL = SUM(DI9, DI44)/DI6.
Market Leverage Ratio, ML = DEBT/SUM(DEBT, MVE).
Market Leverage as suggested By Pilotte(1992),
PL = DEBT/SUM(DEBT, MVCS, DI10).
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Appendix C
The compustat data items used in calculating the variables
defined in the paper.

Compustat
Data Item #
4
5
6
9
10
11
12
13
15
16
19
21
25
29
33
34
44
45
46
107
109
113
128
129
199
235

Compustat Data Item Names
C urretn Assets - Total
C urrent Liabilities - Total
Asstes - Total/Liabilities and Stock Holders
Equity
Long-Term Debt - Total
Preferred Stock - Liquidating value
Common Stock - Tangible
Sales (net)
O perating Income Before Depreciation
Interst Expenses
Income Tax - Total
Dividend - Prefered
Dividend - Common
Common Share Outstanding
Employees
Intangibles
Debt in C urrent Liabilities
Debt Due in One Year
Advertinsing Expenses
Research and Development Expenses
Sale of Property, Plant, and Equipm ent
Sale of Investm ents
Increase in Investments
Capital expenditures ( Statem ent of Cash
Flow)
Acquisitions
Price - Fiscal Year - Close
Common Equity - Liquidation Value
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